



NAVY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT:
A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP
HARRY, WAYNE MORGAN, JR.
LIBRARY






NAVY PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT:
A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP
By
Harry Wayne .Morgan, Jr.
Bachelor of Science, 19*9
United states Naval Academy
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the School of Government,
Business, and International Affairs of The George Washington
University in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the desrree of Master of Business Administration
June 7, 1961
Thesis directed by
Arlin Rex Johnson, Ph.D.




LIST OF ILLUSTRATXOllfl iv
INTRODUCTION , 1
Chapter
I. EXTERNAL PRESSURES AFFECTING NAVY
MANAGEMENT 9
Trends Since tforld War II
Current Trends in Management
Efficiency and Economy
Summary
II. NAVY PLANNING 8X8UK 22
Navy Planning
Programming Flans
Relationship of Programs to
Program Objectives
Problems of The Program Sponsor
The Resources Versus the Programs
Summary
III. HAHAGEIIEIT THEORY AND PLANNING 39
Requirements for the Theory
The !*< is ion-making Process
A New Philosophy
The Structure of Management
Socony i'lobil Oil Company Exaaplt
oplication of Theory to Practice
Summary
IV. AIDS FOR PLANNING 56
Present Uses of Management Science
Long-Range Planning Technlq.
















1. Navy rismning-Strategic and Support 14
2. Department of Defense 17
3. OPWAV Staff-Line Organization in Brief .... 25
4. Time Relationship of faavy xrogramming flans . . 26
5. Schematic Representation of Sequence and
Inputs to Programming ?lani ......... 27
6. Relationship of Program Sponsors,
Coordinators, managers ........... 30
7. Decision Fattern 83
8. Planning and Controlling Cycles ........ 85
9. Functional Costing System .... 89
10. Weapons System Being Operated ... 90
11. Weapons Astern Being Bought 92




Since 1958, there have been three significant develop-
ments which are Interdependent and which greatly affect the
administration of the $avy. It la the purpose of this thesis
to discuss these developments and to relate their bearing upon
future concepts and conduct in the Navy management program.
The most recent development is the Reorganization Act
of 1958, which placed the responsibilities for the operational
command of the Armed Forces in the Office of the Joint Chiefs
of 3taff.* This change puts the operational control of the
assigned naval units under the command of unified commands or
specified combatant commands. The Chief of kaval Operations,
therefore, is tending more and more to take on the appearance
of an executive vice president who is responsible for integrat-
ing the organization, administration, and management of the
Navy Department to meet the requirements of the commands
established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This relationship
makes it imperative that his decisions and actions support the
operational commanders to the best of his ability.
Undoubtedly, there is and will continue to be some
opposition to the concentration of the operational
ii
i mn in ii i i ii i n ii in h i n ii i i . 11 mm —WH ' m WWW—————————W i « i i
0. S., Congress, Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1958 . Public Law 85-599, 85th Cong., 1st Sees., 1958,
P. 5.

2responsibility in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather
than with the three departments. Although Admiral Burke is
known to be vigorously opposed to this policy, he is forced to
comply because of the actions of the Secretary of Defense. In
a few months when the Admiral retires, the Resident will
undoubtedly select a successor who fully supports this concept.
Secondly, the policies of the Department of Defense are not
conceived in isolation, but rather they are principal parts of
our total strategy and total national policy. These policies
no longer can be broken down neatly into three dimensions—land,
sea, and air, because there are now at least two more dimen-
sions—space and time which are boundless. In addition, these
strategies end policies Include factors th*t are political,
economic, and psychological, at well as military. A purely
military peacetime decision is seldom made.^
The second development which is gaining acceptance in
the Department of Defense is that the job of economizing, which
some people would delegate to budgetere or comptrollers, cannot
be distinguished from the whole task of making military deci-
sions. Mr. Charles J. Hitch, currently the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller), and Mr. Roland w* McKean expressed
this thought in this way:
Strategy and cost are as interdependent as the
front Bnd rear sights of a rifle. One cannot assign
relative weights to the importance of the positions
2
C£. , Thomas 3. Gates, Jr., "iso Lag in United States
Defenses, Vital Speeches of the Day (June 1, I960),
DP. 487-88.

of the front and rear eights. It does not make
sense to ask the correct position of the rear
sight except in relation to the front sight and the
target. Similarly one cannot economize except in
choosing strategies (or tactioe or methods) to
achieve objectives.
3
This development has grown more significant every year
since the Korean War because of the increasing cost of weapon
systems. The technological advances in the weapons of war and
the weapons of peace have caused the national security expen-
ditures to grow from |13«© billion in 1950 to 1*5.6 billion
A
for fiscal year I960. This growth no longer subtests a
cost-consciousness of thousands of dollars here or there,
but rather an awareness of long-range planning which forecasts
the costs associated with programs from Inception to phasing
out. This cradle- to-grave concept must be implemented because
of general awareness that our nation must not be confronted
with a growing, ever-steepening spiral of military expenditures
The third development is the tremendous etrldes being
made in the understanding of management and application of new
and radically different aids. In the area of decision-making,
for example, there are many groups working and progressing
such as the economists, psychologists, neurophysiologlsts,
information theorists, cyberneticlans, operations researchers,
Charles ,T. Hitch and Roland U, McKean, The Economics
of Defense in the Sjuolesr flge (Cambridge, KMS*| Harvard
University FresB, 19(50), p. 3.
4
U, 5., Department of the Isiavy, Office of the
Corrntroller, The Budget Process in Kavy . KAVEX03 P-225*
(June, I960), pp. 1-6.

and others,- These scientists are all thinking in the field
of decis ion-making theory. But the connotation indicated here
is the use of the tern management in it£ broader sense of
tactical planning, policy implementation, execution of strategic
plans?, and goal-seeking procedures* Since this paper has
purposely chosen the naval aspects of management, this parameter
also soda a special connotation. It la hastily stated, how-
ever, that the ideas, examples, and implications of business
management from whatever source derived will be used to relate,
to illustrate, to equate the meanings and practices to military
Since management does not exist by Itself, it will be
necessary to consider the supplementary terms of organization
and administration. Orgsnlyatlon is the formal structure of
authority, lines of communication, and formal relationship of
offices. Administration is the strategic planning, goal-
setting kind of behavior at the policy level. Management uses
the organisation to carry out its objectives. Organization is
the structure of an effective machine.
Oliver GhelcSon correlates thsse terms as follows:
. . . management is . . . the control of the
process of executing a given policy and is to be
clearly distinguished, as regards both the activities
involved and the abilities required, from the formulation
of policy, which is the task of the process known as
administration. The two together constitute the control
of this enterprise. In order th?t th^y may function a
living structure is built by the process of organization,
Merrill K« Flood, tfanagement Gcience Today and
Tomorrows Decision Making," Management Science . I
(January, 1955), PP. 167-68.

5bo that what is to bo done and the persona to do
it are grouped for the most efficient working.
There three proceeses--admlnlstration, management
and organlzation--are common to all corporate
undertakings.
6
With this definition of management the barest sugges-
tion of the activity in the field was offered in the area of
decision-making. Other achievements are evident in problem-
solving, management simulation, mathematics as it relates to
management decisions, automatic data processing, and, in
general, the new tools and techniques associated with manage-
ment.
These three developments then, are interdependent.
As the functions of operations per ee become in fact the
responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified
Commanders, the Job of the service chiefs become more nearly
the functions of military managers. ? The service which oan
provide the maximum defense per dollar of cost will assume a
more dominant role. The means to achieve this objective can
be reached only through the most efficient management of the
resources made available to it.
In 1956, David JSovick and Q. H. Fisher in a series of
articles entitled, "The Role of Management Tools in Making
Military Decisions," advanced as their fundamental theory that
there is a necessity for using management tools only after
' " ! II II I ! WW » HI —!! I I |l !
Oliver Sheldon, "Management," Encyclopedia of The
Social Sciences , ed. Kdwin R. A. Seligman, X (ftew York:
The MacMillan Company, 1937), P. 77.
7
Infra ., p. 14.

6proper application has been determined, and then, only after
keeping in Kind the distinctions between corporate and military
management.® It is the contention of this writer that the
new relationship of the Chief of i*aval Operations no longer
makes possible a clear contrast between the corporate and
military manager. In fact, the profit motive of the corporate
manager and the economic motive of the military manager make
for a compatible, closer kinship.
In the Office of the Chief of ftaval Operations the
strategic olannlnp' of the Joint Chiefs of Staff first becomes
implemented in the Kavy.*5 As defined, this implementation of
policy is the management function. The practice of management
Includes the task of making military decisions which can no
longer be divorced from the job of economizing. The management
of these resources need special tools and techniques to ensure
optimization. Many of these devices are adaptable to military
management.
These ideas then are the parameters of the problem
which is under observation in this thesis. The boundaries are
not set because they do not form an island of action surrounded
by a moat which makes the Island look like a whole problem.
Rather the parameters are flexible; and where they mesh with
°Davld Kovick and G. H. Fisher, "The Role of Management
Tools in Making Military Decisions," Armed Forces Management .
II (September, 1956), pp. 42-44; III ( October, 19*6), dt>. 12-14;
IV (November, 1956), pp. 25, 34-39.
9
Infra ., p. 25,

7other duties and resDonsibilities in the organization of the
Havy Department, these factors will be examined also. In
business management the duties of the production manager, the
financial manager, the sales manager, research and development
manager, and others have a bearing on one another. The
examination of one of these areas only focuses the problem and
does not imply that it will be studied in complete isolation.
In fact, the effort in this paper is toward a vision of the
whole and not a narrow focus in order to arrive at a "how to
do it M solution.
It is felt that the association of these ideas is
related, however, and that if other frames of logic are built
in a similar manner, a structure of the whole may be developed
which will become more meaningful. Perhaps there will be
questions left unanswered or even factors ignored, but these
faults are not as serious, it seems, as complete disregard of
the old situation which modern theory already has demonstrated
to be obsolete. Some of the former principles of management
fail to support the concepts of management today.
But the point is to improve 1 Start somewhere and carry
the theory and logic to a conclusion. This objective is
illustrated in this thesis. It is hoped that it will stimulate
others who are better qualified, better informed, more creative,
more ingenious to coordinate and to correlate the theory and
the practices so that a better Job can be done by the mightiest
Navy in the world—the United States i-lavy.

8'The advice from the operating manager? that, "you
have not studied all of the problem, or "the problem is much
Digger than you have indicated' may be valid. But let us make
sure that the criticism is made honestly and not to avoid
change or to belittle. In an address before the Seventh
National Conference of the Armed Forces Management Association,
Mr. Elmer B. Staats, Deputy director, U. 8< Bureau of Budget,
pinpointed this thought;
If there is one paramount problem in tackling
management improvement, I believe it is the problem
of how we go about structuring our improvement effort.
We consistently set it up on a staff activity, exposed
to the hurricane force of entrenched operating resis-
tance, and we never seem to understand why it <3oesn't
get very far* 1 hope we're finally learning that
staff-level management Improvement Is Just the icinsr
on the cake; the nourishment and flavor is in the
cake itself. The role of the staff management arm
should not be to force improvement? it should be
there to guide and assist the oper^tinc? wtatgwt
who themselves have the urge to find better ways
of doing their job. 10
10 P.lmer B. 3taats, "Good Meneioreisent— F'or Petter
Government." Address before the Seventh National Conference




EXTERNAL PRESSURES AFFECTING NAVY MANAGEMENT
In this chapter we shall examine some of the external
factors which have been and are now affecting Navy management.
Although it would be possible to trace these influences back
many years, the trend since World War II will be briefly
discussed; then the current situation will be highlighted.
It will be noted that many changes in administration, manage-
ment, and organization have taken place. It is these changes
which have given the Chief of Naval Operations a different
relationship In the military establishment. The reader should
bear in mind the distinction between hie title as Chief of
Naval Operations, which is being studied here, and his position
as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, it will be
observed that greater emphasis is being placed on the meaning
of efficiency and economy in the Department of Defense.
Trends Since World war IJ.
Since World War II, many and varied pressures which
affect the management of military services have been developing,
One of the first steps toward closer military supervision and




for a Secretary of Defense; for a national Military
Establishment; for a Department of the Array, a
Department of the Navy, and a Department of the
Air Force; and a coordination of the activities
of the National Military establishment with other
departments and agencies of the government. . • .*
The duties of the Secretary of Defense were to exercise general
direction, authority and control over the departments; to
establish general policies and programs for the National Military
Establishment, to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the
fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health,
and research; and to supervise and coordinate the preparation
of the budget estimates of the departments. It is seen that,
at first, his duties were fairly general and without force
because the act also provided the Secretaries of the Departments
direct access to the President, essentially because they
maintained their cabinet status.
In 19^9, this weakness in authority of the Secretary of
Defense over the departments of the military services was
changed by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949» which
primarily reorganized fiscal management in the National
Military Establishment to promote economy and efficiency. This
act also reduced the status of the military services from
executive departments to military departments (no cabinet
status), and at the same time established the Department of
^U. S., Congress, National Security Act of 19^7 .
Public Law 253 » 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
2
U. S., Congress, National Security Act Amendments
of 1949 . Public lW2l6, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
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Defense with the military departments subdivisions thereof.
The identified duties of the Secretary of Defense provided that
he have direction, authority, and control over the Department
of Defense. To assist him In exercising these duties, the
act also provided for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Armed Forces
Policy Council, Munitions Board, Research and Development
Board, Deputy and three Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and
establishment of a Comptroller of the Department of Defense.
But this centralization of power was still not enough
to accomplish the purposes of the President and Congress. In
the ^organization Plan No. 6 of 1953, all functions of the
Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board snd the
Defense Supply Management Agency, and the Director of Installa-
tions were transferred to the Secretary of Defense. The
management of these boards was too ineffective, so that the
functions were re-established in the office of the Department
of Defense where three new Assistant Secretaries of Defense
were provided. This concentration of policy formulation and
management coordination in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the establishment of the planning functions in the
Joint Staff instead of through executive directives of the
departments reduced the secretaries of the military departments
to the status of operational managers only.
The Reorganization Act of 1958 further stripped the
%




secretaries by placing the operational command of the land,
sea, and air forces under the direct control of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who received their directions from the
Secretary of Defense. This ohange greatly strengthened the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.
The act provided, in part:
. . . for the establishment of integrated
policies and procedures for the departments, agencies,
and functions of the government relating to the
national security; . . . for the establishment of
unified or specified combatant commands, and a
clear and direct line of command to such commands;
, . . more effective, efficient, and economical
administration in the Department of Defense; . • .
for the unified strategic direction of the combatant
forces, for their operation under unified command,
and for their integration into an efficient team
of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish
single Chief of Staff over the armed forces. . • .*
If the reorganization in 1953, made only operational
managers of the service secretaries, It would seem that this
change in 1958, left the Navy Secretary merely a manager of
the naval assets. Strategic planning and operational command
are vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and policy formulation
and management coordination are concentrated in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense. To appreciate the full impact of
this 1950 law observe, in amplification, the language in
section 50)
:
With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff the President, through the Secretary of
Defense, shall establish unified or specified
combatant commands for the oerformance of military
missions, and shall determine the force structure
«—»———»——MM II mn ri ini in in Il l l . i ——— I I .il l «.»M—————» I II I I i n «—I
—
4
U. 6*, Congress, Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1958 . Public Law 85-5^9, 85th Cong., 2nd Seas,, p. 2.
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of such combatant commands to be compoEed of forcec
of the Department of the Army, the Department of the
Navy, the Department of the Air Force, which shall
then be assigned to such combatant commands by the
departments concerned for the oerformanoe of such
military missions. Such combatant commands are
responsible to the President ??nd the Tecretary of
Defense for such military missions as may be assigned
to them by the Secretary of Defence, with the approval
of the President. Forces assigned to such unified
combatant commands or specified combatant commands
shall be under the full operational command of the
commander of the unified combatant command or the
commander of the specified combatant command.
5
Thus the Chief of Naval Operations, as senior naval
advisor to the Secretary of the Wavy, is no longer primarily
an operational commander, but in reality he becomes an
administrator of the support and logistic functions of the
Navy Department to ensure that the naval component commanders
have what they need, where they need it, when they need it.
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates the chain of operational command
through the Joint Chiefs of Bt*ff and the chain of administra-
tive command via the Secretary of the I.avy rnd the Chief of
Naval Operations. The Chief of ftaval Operations appears by
himself only in the line of Wavy support. Wearing this hat
it is evident that he is no longer responsible for I.avy
decisions which are purely strategic. Instead, hie planning
will support the strategic decisions determined by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and provided to him via planning guidance.
Ultimately, we shall see that the end-product of all Wavy
planning is to provide and support the forces—ships, aircraft,
weapons, and men with which our commanders fight.
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Current Trends in .''anaftemer
To dramatize the present attitude of government offi-
cials toward this concent, let ua briefly interpret some
actions which have taken piece Bince President Kennedy took
office on January 20, 1061. On February 20 , 1061, President
Kennedy abolished the Operations Coordination Board. " This
board was l hifth-level, secret ?rrouo created in 1957, to
implement decisions of the National Security Council. One of
the functions of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans
and Policy}—the principal naval strategic planner—was to
provide for coordination of staff support on the National
Security Council, Operations Coordination Board, Mutual Defense
Assistance Program, nnd Armed Forces Policy Council matters.'
With the elimination of this board the Chief of Naval Operations
now receives his coordinative action ssslfcniaente , not through
the OCB, but from the Secretary of Defense via the Joint Chiefs
of Staff* This action was described as part of Mr« Kennedy's
program to "streamline the policy-making machinery by scuttling
some of the hundreds of interagency committees now in
existence. ,;
Secondly, Secretary of Defense Robert 8. McNamara
continued this trend toward coordinating- action and olanning
^The Sveplnst Star ( ashlngton, D. C), February 20,
1961, p. A-4.
'U. S«, Department of the i\iavy, Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, OPMV Instruction 5430.23 (May, 1953).
o




under the Joint Chiefs of Staff by reducing the aotlvlty of
the Armed Forces Policy Council to a "when called" basis. This
council advises the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad
policy relating to the armed forces and considers and reports
Q
such other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.
The announced reason for the reduction in the frequency of
meetings of thin council w*s to improve efficiency by directing
these broad policy matters to the three service secretaries
for imiredlPte personal comment. These two and other actions
of the Kennedy- c i I team will bring greater military
unification by curbing duplication and Interservlce rivalries, 10
Another action by Mr. Xc&amara is his establishment
of an office for management and organizational planning in the
Department of Defense. * At the same time, he abolished two
intent defense secret-try posts, reducing the number of
Presidential appointees who report directly to him. Figure 2
rhowF the? present organlxatlea of the Department of Defense.
It Is known that I r. ti I -mara has strong ideas about
management, which he intends to apply. In fact, he is
^U. C, Department of the Savy, Bureau of Naval
Personnel, ; - ' nidation for National Security , NavPere 10795
(April, If99)r »• t.
10 The fal|„, Street Journal , garth 20, 1961, p. 1.
11U. S. , Depertfflent of Defense, DOQ .Directive dumber
5145.3, "Responsibility for Management an4 Organization Planning
Within the rtaent of Defense/' January 30, 19bl.
3?
"Those posts eliminated were: Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Properties and Instill :tions) whose duties were ab-
sorbed by A30 (Supply and Logistics); and ASD (Health and
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characterized In 1 recent Business freek article as a
professional manager:
A look at MeNamara's record brings out the
portrait of a top-grade professional manager able
to apply hie administrative talents to any institu-
tional management problem. He is a prize specimen
of a remarkable breed in U. S. industry—the trained
specialist in the science of business management who
is also a generallet moving easily from one technical
area to another. 13
It seems likely, therefore, that the trend commenced
by the National Security Act of 1947, is gaining momentum under
the new Secretary of Defense. As he apparently sees it, unifi-
cation means assuring that the services do not have overlapping
functions and that they employ common approaches to strategy,
logistics, administration, and management practices.
Efficiency and Economy
In addition to the management impact on planning there
le another closely related attitude—the impact of defense
spending. In the Business Week article previously quoted, the
point is made? *'McHamara believes major decisions should be
based as often as possible on quantitative analysis, or on
economic analysis measuring costs in relation to strategic
gains and alternative decisions."1^
Mr. McMamara is not a big spender; he sees with the
eye of an experienced comptroller (a post he held at Ford Motor
1^ n, Pro' Manager Takes on Military," Business Week .
February 11, 1961, p. 98.
14
Ibid ., p. 106.

19
Company in 1949). To support him in hie drive for efficiency
and economy, he has selected Mr* Charles J, Hitch, former
chief economist of the Rand Corporation, as comptroller in the
Department of Defense* As one of the two authors of The
Economics of Defense in the fluclear Age . Mr. Hitch is known to
believe that all military nroblems are economic problems insofar
as they Involve the efficient allocation and use of resources.
To demonstrate the closeness of the Kc^amara-Kltoh concepts,
Mr. McNamara has appointed Mr. Hitch to head a special study
group to review the strategy for all-out-war with greater
emphasis on wartime survival of missiles and bombers and less
emphasis on sheer number. Mr. Richard Fryklund, a staff writer
for The Evening Gtar newspaper, when reporting on the Hitch
study group stated
• • . r. McNamara is not looking for ft basic
big-war policy, but for quick changes that can be
worked into his first budget request and for a
broad strategic war philosophy which can be trans-
lated later into a specific administration position. *5
Here, then, we see the close relationship of economics and
defense.
Another factor which is related to efficiency and
economy is the establishment of a new post entitled Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for Programs
.
Mr. Hitch was influenced in this decision by Dr. Dave Novick
of the Rand Corporation, who Is a strong advocate of program
The Evening Star (.ashington, D. C), February
15, 1961, p. A-10.

20
analysis. The new Deputy is Mr. Hugh McCullough, formerly
in the Office of Analysis and Review in the Navy Department.
Kr. McCullough's selection implies that Mr. Hitch will rely
on new scientific methods to ensure balance in the Department
of Defense urograms and to measure the degree to which those
programs Bupport the national strategy. It is elso fair to
assume from reading Mr. Hitch's book that these budget programs
will have a different relationship to long-range planning than
has been used in the past. In discussing the indicators of
performance—the programs, the authors imply the need for
improvement in the statement, "... long-range planning and
also programming have been in terms of military units, but
budgeting (that If, translating the programs into costs) has
usually been in terms of other categories . ''^
rMigffar,Y
If in 1961, we think that an |80 billion Federal
budget is a staggering sum of money, the Bureau of the Budget
experts are already talking about |100 billion of annual
spending by 1970.^ These additional billions are not expected
in defense spending but rather in urograms for relief, health,
-^Dsvld Novice, "A ^ew Approach to the Military
Budget," U. S, Air Force Project Rand Research Memorandum .
RM-17C 9 ( nanta Monica , California : ~nd CorDor?tIon) , p?D. II-
ill.
17
riiteh and McKean, n. 61.
18
"On the Way—Budgets of 100 - HI ion Dollars,"
U. S. News and World Report . February 20, 1961, p. 90.
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schools and other welfare side, snsce exploration, natural-
resoureee development, economic aid abroad, postal service,
and others. It is evident, therefore, that defense spend in?
will become even more restrictive, iriore closely related to
strategic planning . Military planners and msnaja-ement programs
will need new tools and techniques to correlate objectives and
costs. In order to grow stronger through expensive advanced
technology, iMavy planners must recognize these external factors
which emphasize economic considerations and adopt management
scientific methods which maximize defense at minimum costs.
A study of the present &avy Dlanning system will help us in




In this chapter is examined some of the complexities
of long-range planning as it develops in the Office of the
Chief of Haval Operations (OPNAV). To serve the purpose of
this thesis, it will not be necessary to analyze the functions,
responsibilities, tasks, or even the intricate structure of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in order to illus-
trate the point that nlanning and coordination of programs and
dollars are presently too complicated to be effective,
£avy FlqnqlPff
A terse but striking look at the Navy planning process
was presented by Mr. Sid Freeman of the Navy Management Office
when he wrote?
Visualize a man just graduated as a master auto
mechanic. Then put him in a car, and when the
speed orceter hits 70 mph hand him his tools and tell
him; *0K, get out there and overhaul the engine! f
Ridiculous? Perhaps. But that's about what we
ask of our planning etsiff in the Navy, who must
prepare plans in a management environment that*s
in a constant state of flux, ltdSt of our planning
aids—most of the manuals and the textbooks—are
built around the techniques of military operational
planning, which is oriented around fixed points.
1
^Wil« ll II Mill IH IUM » II U IWW WMMP 1 1 !,»—M l I M I I N II- M « I 'I IMM , W. ill 111! I »lfc»..W ...— m —>«—W———i PMM—WW^PWPMWW II- I— i ——J—» MM1—
W
i id Freeman, "Some Important Considerations in




Mr, Freemen's contention is that the operational planning
technique—highly developed and proven—ha.c been borrowed and
used for planning systems prescribed for continuous logistics-
type operations, such as budgeting, procurement, oereonnel
strengths, because it is the best understood approach. But a
new approach is needed
.
Planning is one nrooees in the series of continuous
and contiguous management cycles of planning, organizing,
directing, coordinating, and evaluating. One of the most
important elements of the Navy planning process is the trans-
lation of the task into action, TfeiS is the requirement of the
program. A Drogram is 1 system of administrative actions
designed for the accomplishment of a definite objective. This
objective, in turn, is derived from the program objectives
which are definite statements of reasonably attainable goals
planned for accomplishment during a specified time period.
The myogram objectives in the >;avy planning system are
•*pr*SS«6 in the Projected Program Objectives and Annual
Program Objectives documents issued by the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations. The Projected Program Objectives are
prepared by the; $#nt**l Planning "rou-. The Director of this
division, "under the direction of the Vice Chief of rlaval
Operations, If responsible for coordinating the preparation of
this document."^ Six line divisions and four of the staff
department of the Havy, Office of the Chief of naval
Operations, "The &&vy Planning System," OPKAV Instruction
5000. 19A of 21 July I960.
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divisions (Figure 3) *>re charged with review of various
tgBtftta of this document. These segments are derived from
component plans prepared by nine of these same ten divisions
(less the Long Range Planning Group) plus the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, the six technical bureaus, and the Office of
Naval Material. The ?;avy Projected Program Objectives provide
for the coordination and integration of selected $avy programs
during the five year mid-range period (Figure 4). The objective
document is prepared to implement the missions and general
tasks which stem from the national Security Act of 19^7, as
amended, and other national laws; functions of the Department
of defense and its major components; ^oint plans; naval policy;
and other directives.-^ It includes operational and logistic
implementation. Ho attempt is made to price the programs for
this flve-ye?r period , although one of the inputs, the long-
range objectives, is Bade with fiscal ^sumptions (Figure 5).
Tiie annual increment of the Projected Program objec-
tives aocument which outlines the peacetime objectives and
program of the Nav?l Establishment in general terms and
provides the broad basif for the formulation of the annual
budget estisates for the fiscal year commencing 1 July eighteen
months l n ter. It is issued about 1 Febr'r-ry with the Creneral
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SEQUENCE AND INPUTS TO PROGRAMMING PLANS
NMS JSOP
^
JCS Long Range Strategic Estimates BUDGET
Nat'l & Military Strategy ESTIMATES







NMS—Navy Mid Range Study
NOP—Navy Objective Plan
JSOP--Joint Strategic Objective Plan





BNEP--Basic Naval Establishment Plan
Figure 5
BNEP
Issued as soon as
annual Appropria-




With this over-simplified explanation of the ftavy
Planning System there are two salient factors to highlight:
1. The General Planning Group, as a staff division,
Is not responsible for making decisions when conflicting
strategies, plans or programs, are presented, although to
resolve conflicts they make suggestions to the line and staff
divisions.
2. As stated at the beginning of this chapter a
program Is a course of action to achieve a epecific result
necessary for the fulfillment of a requirement. That require-
ment le generally stated in military terms or missions. The
program, therefore, is the translation of the tasks into
action.
The logical questions which arise from these factors
are? Who makes the decision? Who does the translating? Let
us address ourselves to the second question first because it
will assist in analyzing the decision-making process later by
knowing how the programs are developed.
In program planning alone there are essentially three
levels of decision-making, which can be illustrated by
defining the terms Program Sponsor, Program Coordinator, and
Program Managers
The Program Sponsors are the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, the Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations, the Assistant
Chief of Saval Operations (Naval Reserve), the Chief of Naval
Material, and the Director, Naval Petroleum Reserves, who
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coordinate and integrate their particular programs,*
Program coordinators are reoresentatives of the program
sponsors. They are designated permanent working groups and
are the liaison officers with the orogram managers in the
bureaus and offices.^ Many day-to-day decisions in executing
programs are made by these officers.
Program managers are the officials responsible for the
direct execution of a definite T>ro?ram or portion of a
program, ^ They are usually located in the various bureaus and
offices of the Navy Department (Figure 6).
Relationship of Programs to Programs Objectives
Program objectives are definite statements of require-
ments and are issued by OPMV as guides for current and future
planning by operating managers in the bureaus and offices.
They establish in quantitative or qualitative terms what needs
to be accomplished. These program objectives are requirements,
A requirement is an expression of a specific demand generated
by a strategic plan or strategic concept for products, services,
or resources. Every program which is supported with men,
money, services, and/or facilities is contained in the program
objectives. One-year requirements for programs must be
U, S«. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, "Preparation of the Department of the
$avy Annual Program Objectives (P0), H OPMV Instruction 5010.17
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adequately set forth in the annual orogram objectives document
in order that funding and personnel imnllcations may be
considered in perspective with all other requirements.
The annual program objectives include specific quantity
objectives such as the combat units to be supported in the
fleet; the number, type and designation of the operating- and
support vessels; the number of operating aircraft by organiza-
tional unit; numbers and categories of military personnel for
the fleet and shore establishment; average number of steaming
hours for the fleet; and similar guidance factors* The
qualitative terms are general statements as to the level of
maintenance of facilities, limitations as to the expected level




very effort is made to express these objectives in
precise terms. However, because the area encompassed by each
program objective is eo broad and the goal that each is to
achieve is so general, they become more mutually inclusive
than exclusive. ^l® lack of interrelationship is particularly
evident in the program structure to which the objectives give
rise.
The Program Objectives document presently includes about
36 specific programs. A program is a system of administrative





Each of thee© programs is intended to support one or more of
the program objectives. As such, they attempt to establish
specific and detailed guidelines. However, the degree of
explicitness is determined primarily by the degree of limita-
tion that is inherent in the objective of the program.
For example, the polarls program has definite limits
to its objective. Therefore, specific plans of action to
achieve specific goals by specific times can be established.
One of the criteria for establishing an objective is: if the
necessary money is made available, the requirement program
for a given year could realistically be produced in thstt time
period using a peace-time industrial base and peacetime
working schedules. In this Dol^ris example the relationship
to its urogram objective is direct. Other programs, in
contrast, such as the active fleet maintenance and improvement
program, electronics program, or the mine warfare program are
not defined in such specific terms. Consequently, methods for
achievement of these objectives are equally general.
Programs in such areas have only supporting implica-
tions in relation to the program objectives, since they usually
affect more than one objective. Jhile the program relationship
to program objective Is often Indirect, the connection between
programs Is closely Interrelated. For example, the shipbuild-
ing and conversion program has as its formal objective, ''to
provide an adequate ^avy for the future . . ." with emphasis
on " • • • achieving a fleet ballistic missile capability;
improvement in ASW capabilities; Increased mobility and striking
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power; and an adequate capability for amphibious lift, mine
warfare, and fast mobile replenishment."
We know, however, there exists another specific program
(polarls program) with the purpose of achieving a fleet
ballistic ralseile capability. Similarly, there are other
specific programs in the field of anti-submarine warfare, mine
warfare, and fast mobile supply support at sea. These programs
are aircraft procurement, mine warfare, and underway replenish-
ment, respectively. Thus, the explicit wording" of the
shipbuilding and conversion program reveals that this one
program is closely related to at least four other specific
programs and an indeterminate number of program objectives.
The identification of the operating managers responsible for
carrying out a specific program and the resources allocated
for the achievement of a program are, therefore, serious
problems for the program sponsor.
Before analyzing the problems of the program sponsor
there are two points of focus to be noted in a preliminary
way j
1. The first observation is that the polaris project
is well-structured with finite parameters suoh as definite
numbers of nuclear-powered submarines, definite numbers of
missiles, finite time schedules, and other snecific goals.
2. The second observation is that the shipbuilding
R
U. B* t Department of the Navy, Navy Management
Office, Financial Management Purvey
. May, 1959, p. 6.
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and conversion complex is an ill-structured program with
parameters which interact with many other tasks.
Problems of the Program Sponsor
Each of the specific programs has a designated QPfcAV
sponsor who is responsible for developing the statement of
objectives and reviewing each proposed plan. His representa-
tive, the program coordinator, continuously reviews changes in
light of new developments and techniques. Since a program such
as anti-submarine warfare cuts across line functions of
Operations and Readiness, Air, Logistics, and Development
(Figure 6), more than one sponsor may be assigned to one
program with one of the sponsors assigned the task of coordina-
tion. In one case the problem became so complex that in 1958,
an anti-submarine warfare executive billet was created to
provide the Chief of Naval Operations with special assistance
In planning and direction of all matters pertaining to anti-
submarine warfare readiness (Figure ?).
The difficulties inherent in the orogram objective and
structure are largely overcome at the inception by means of
personal contact and direct organizational and nrofessional
knowledge of the program coordinators. The planning system is
therefore generally operative, though not as effective as could
be desired. In the anti-submarine warfare example previously
mentioned, the coordinator for air may receive planning
estimates for program managers In the Bureau of Naval Weapons,
Bureau of Naval Personnel, and Office of Naval Research for
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details concerning aircraft procurement, personnel training,
and compatibility of new detection equipment, respectively.
His decisions are sent to the sponsor who bases overall
decisions on factors from each of the other coordinators. For
him to be knowledgeable about all details would be impossible.
It is no wonder that stories circulate in the Pentagon that
Admiral Burke "hit the overhead*' when he learned that the
latest electronic equipment for destroyers gathered dust in
the warehouses because no one arranged for funds to install it.
Although the story is hearsay, the probability is high that it
or similar oversights could certainly develop in such a comolex
structure. This difficulty stems primarily from the multi-
purpose role of the levy's organization and from the Planning
system which was designated for an entirely different purpose.
Finally, the sponsor's knowledge of resources is
complicated and limited by our appropriation structure. Parts
of a nrogram may be budgeted for in different appropriations
or as different subheads in the same appropriation. For example
the electronic program is funded primarily from the "Ship-
building and Conversion" subhead in the "Operations and
Maintenance, iu'avy" appropriation; but it is also supported by
other appropriations such as "Research and Development, Test
and Evaluation." It is often difficult to determine how much
is actually funded by each appropriation to su-cnort the total
effort. This is an additional problem area which the program





As we have seen, the translation of the task into
action requires the bast thinking of staff and line exnerts at
many levels of manajrenent. The objectives which set forth the
various requirements cut across many line? of authority and
responsibility in both OPNAV and the bureaus. Diversification,
growth, and the interrelationships of the i*avy Department— all
of these add and continue to add to the complexity of manage-
ment, to the proliferation of data and reports, and to the
amassing of material for consideration in decision-making.
Kven the selection of material for the next reviewing authority
li a decision-making process so that some decisions are being
made at all levels. Eventually, when the resources (which may
be represented by dollars) do not fully meet the requirements,
the ultimate and most difficult of decisions is placed before
the Chief of ftaval Operations— ton management.
The Resources Versus the Programs
When the time arises to match the available resources
with the objectives, the fit is an obvious misfit. The program
objectives may price out at |19 billion when the estimated
available resources are more likely to be 12 billion. . ith
the oressure of deadlines in the budget nrocess, the oroblem is
placed before the Cn*Q Advisory Board consisting of the Vice
Chief of Naval Operations, the six Deputy chiefs of *<aval
Operations, the Chief of ^'aval Material, the Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations (Administration), the Deputy Comptroller, a
representative of the Commandant of the Marine corps, and the
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Assistant Chief of &aval Operations (General Planning) who acts
as Secretary. *° This board attempts to make the difficult
decisions to fit the programs to the resources. The issues
which they cannot resolve are referred to the Chief of &aval
Operations and eventually the wecretsry of the Navy for final
decisions.
The CNC Advisory Board listens to the various sponsors
(which include the Deputies and the Commandant) present their
requirements to support the program objectives. Fach justifica-
tion Is based on a synthesis of material facts. Ultimately,
however, the board is faced with the decision of reducing,
eliminating, balancing the planning factors to bring them in
line with the dollars. It is a slow, difficult process which
is a value, composite judgment of these officers. At times,
only hindsight may prove them right or wrong. It 1e hypothe-
sized that they must often wish tfcrt if only the questions placed
before them could be phrased in a different manner, the alter-
natives for decision-making could be more realistically and
clearly stated.
Summary
In tracing the complexities of long-range planning It
is seen that there Is a structural complexity and a complexity
associated with the actions and decisions which make up the
planning process. The structural complexity is caused by the
U. S*g Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief




need to conform to an operational (consumer) organization in
OPNAV and a producer concent through the bureau and office
system of the Navy Department. Secondly, since the Job of
managing these programs has necessitated breaking them down
into component parts to be acted upon by the bureaus, the
principle of suboptimizatlon has been put into effect so that
the management of the whole is realized only by chance. On
top of these two problems is superimposed the framework of the
budget appropriation structure.
The ultimate result of this structural distortion is
that the decision-making process becomes so complicated and
involved that when the CKO Advisory Board or the Chief of waval
Operations takes final action, they are forced onto the horns
of dilemma. The choice leaves them "drawn and quartered"
whichever decision ie made. Since the growth of technology
is eo rapid, and since the cost of new weapons of war ie so
high, the decisions are bound to grow more burdensome.
Fortunately, the external pressures and changes
discussed in Chapter I are forcing the Navy to reexamine its
Drogram planning. The reduction in the operational and strate-
gic requirements will permit OPMV to change its management to
eupport to a greater degree the administrative and logistic
requirements. In addition, the impact of r. Hitch' b approach
to the economics of defense will force new practices. Finally,
It will be seen that the new tools ?nd techniques of management
make possible new building materials for accomplishing the tasks




MANAGEMENT THEORY. AND PLANNING
From Chapter I it is concluded that the need for the
Chief of Haval Operations to concentrate on operational plan-
ning has been lessened by recent events and that economic
factors are gaining increasing significance in measuring
defense. In Chapter II it appeared that the present system
of operational planning, which was adapted for logl6tic-type
planning such as budgeting, has become too cumbersome for
making sound decisions, which are no longer solely military
decisions. This chapter develops the management theory which
will enable top management to make decisions in new
environment.
Requirements for the Theory
The need for a new concept is already Baking planning
extremely important. In a special feature section of U. S« News
and World Report entitled " ashington whispers" (items appear
which are being talked about in Washington) , the following
brief note was reported:
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, if military
officials are right, is having studies made, using
cost-accounting methods, to determine the relative
cost of putting a ton of nuclear explosives on target




The idea would be to determine which method
gives the most for the money.
1
It would seem, therefore, that the new management concept
should incorporate a structure of logic which maximizes the
economics of defense as a basic purpose.
Secondly, the system should be constructed so that the
decisions of top management are presented in such a way that a
number of alternatives are given so that political and psycho-
logical factors, which the human brain may best evaluate, may
be considered in the analysis of alternatives, lor example, if
one alternative requires the closing of a naval installation,
a factor which may be politically unpopular on Capitol Hill,
the decision-makers can evaluate a slightly different alterna-
tive to avoid the closing or examine in detail the factors
which justify the desired alternative. Thus, if the alterna-
tive is the best one militarily and economically, top management
can concentrate its creative thinking on influencing the
political side of the picture.
Thirdly, in order to develop the theory, we must
practice empathy— imaginative Projection of one's own
consciousness into another being. 2 In this case, the other
being is the Chief of Naval Operations whose thinking is
oriented toward the military concept of need. And yet, he has
^Washington Whispers," U. F, itewe and World Report
.
February 27, 1961, p. 30.
2
H. Adm. Lot ii.nsey , USN, Deputy Comptroller of the
Navy, in an address before the Navy Graduate Comotrollership
Program at The George Washington University, 7 October I960.
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to nractice empathy himself to thoee at the Secretary of the
Navy level and to the Department of Defense officials.
Therefore, the system must be alert to factors outside his
own office. The principal focus in this thesis will be,
however, on the methodology at the OPNAV level so that in the
next chapter we may examine some tools and techniques which
may be used to do an orderly and systematic job of managing.
The Decision-flaking; Process
Although a prodigious amount of literature exists
about the decision-making process, it is not the ourpose of
this paper to review or even to synthesize it. Rather the brief
analysis of Dr. Peter Drucker will be adopted because in
perspective it is applicable to the problem at hand. Professor
Drucker determined the process to be analyzed in five crucial
stages
:*
1. Defining the situation. This is not problem
solving, but rather it is finding the right question and then
looking for a range of alternatives, esch with distinct risks
of its own and none completely solving the problem.
2. Determining what is relevant. This means a
systematic effort to determine the measurement appropriate
to the situation.
3« Determining the scone and validity of factual
knowledge. Since factual knowledge in military situations is
^Peter F. Drucker, "* Management Science' and the
Manager," Management Science , T (January 1955)* np. 115-17.
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often limited, the decision will involve risk because it is
a decision for the future, and it will be based on imperfect
knowledge even of the theoretical knowable situation,
4, Developing all the alternative solutions.
Determining advantages and disadvantages, prospective gains,
risks and ooste, their effects, their impact and their timing.
5» insuring that the chosen solution is made effective
in action. It is characteristic of the decision-maker's work
that this action Is (a) always human action, and (b) always
action of other people. To be effective a decision must be
both understood and accepted by others. An effective method
of Information Is therefore required.
Without implying that this method of decision-making
1© either inclusive or conclusive, the following tentative
invariants seem to be presents
a. It if primarily concerned with group decisions.
b. The act of decision-making is a sequential process.
c. It is explicit that the process recognizee the
need to deal with multivariant dynamic systems of
considerable size. These include generalizing
from case studies based on observations, the
utilization of an accounting system, the use of
observations and Interviews to construct




d. It implies certain nonretional asnects of decision-
making which in some oases may be overcome by a
restatement of the oroblem and by the design of
measures of effectiveness.
If these constants are present (and it is hoped that they
appear to be), then this theory of decision-making approaches
the study of decision-making in various disciplines reported by
Martin Shubik in his generalizations about the methods and
substance of decision-making in a recent edition of the
Adff4nl0tyaUve Sff fte°ce, quarterly. 4
Next, what does the top manager need for decision
making?
If A strict method to be able to Judge rationally
and responsibly.
2. A strict method for the decision-making process
as a whole.
3. An integrated process to determine relevant facts
for a definite situation.
4. A "feed-back" from the results to the process to
tell if the decision is effective or not.
5. A program of the whole with a logical structure
that embraces the whole process and represents it logically,
and a communication system to tie the narts and the whole
system together.-*
Martin Shubik, "Studies and Theories of Decision
taking, " Administrative
.
Science Quarterly (December 1958),
pp. 305-067~






To achieve these objectives the t,avy philosophy has
been to Issue more rules aal regulations than are necessary so
that with age ftttd size the practice becomes a disease. Those
who coll themselves procedural analysts even try to anticipate
needs. They make rules for individual occurrences and for
situations thAt are largely nonrecurring. They have a passion
for neat little packages. They adopt the mental set of the
lawyer, which is antipathetic to pood management, The lawyer
likes to reduce everything to writing; the manager 1 s Instinct
tells him to formalize as little as he can because management
is constant change and efficiency is flexibility.
Yet, if the organization is large or the management
function ia subordinate to the operational function, this
philosophy may be necessary. After all, the principle of the
span of control limits the number of workers that a manager
can direct to some number between 4 and 11. This principle,
therefore, implies an organization which appears like a tall,
steep pyramid with • small base. But the nrinciple of
communication requires that the lines of communication through*
out the organization should be short which makee the organiza-
tion structure appear like I short, squat pyramid with a broad
base. Obviously, these two principles of management are
mutually exclusive so that the manager has tried to resolve
w York
6
C£. , M. E. Dlmock, A Phlloecmhy o f Administration
: Harper and Bro there , lubl ishers , 1953), p. 110,
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these two opposing pointe of view by organizing for the
principle of control and then issuing myriad of directives
to serve the principle of communications. ' Neither solution
fully serves the decision-^- king process of the manager.
The Structure of Management
The second point of focus then is the structure of the
enterprise. In Chapter II was Analyzed the structure of the
fcavy planning system, and it was noted with dismay its
complexity. In many respects it may be likened to Dr. Drucker's
nine dimensional structure; of the business enterprise." The
NPvy organization exists on three levels— each embracing the
whole enterprise but neither, by itself, containing it:
a. The physical level as an organized aggregate of
physical things such as ships, aircraft, missiles,
and other end -products.
b. The economic level as an organization of economic
values (end-products) for economic purposes
(defense, national security) which will be measured
by the abstractions of economic rationality (cost
of weapons, assets).
c. The organization is a community of human beings
joined together for common as well as for
'For other illustrations of incompatible principles
see H. A. Simons, "Some Problems of Administrative Theory,"
Chanter II, Administrative Behavior (New York: The MaeMillan
Company, 1947), pp. 20-44.





On each of the^e three levels the „.qvy or?- tion
always by necessity and simultaneously exists in three
dimensions
:
a. 'ctione and decisions are affected by internal
forces and external environment. They must satisfy
both internal and external requirements.
b. Actions and decisions must be based on their con-
tribution to the performance and results of the
entire ^avy and must ultimately be judged by them.
Put they are carried out in parts.
c. The organisation lives always and simultaneously
in (at least) two time dimensions: the immediate
future and the long-range future, "very action
and decision affects both.
It is this structural complexity that is the unique
problem of managing, and it means the following for the
manager j
a. He can never manage by a single objective.
b. ivery decision is aimed at bringing about action
by people.
c. In every managerial decision qualitative—moral
and spiritual --factors are necessarily part of the
situation. (Political and r>r>yeholocrical importance
way be assumed here).
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d. For the most difficult administration of the Navy
—WHglrttl decisions should be b.-jsed on i vision
of the whole.
I basic problem of the manager in business or in the
wavy is that he can no longer manage by rubontiraizin* and by
hopln<x for the best. Indeed, unless he uses the tools that
enable him to perceive the whole business In all its complexity,
he will not be able to mutism at all because of:
a. .'hnolop-ical developments in new weapons,
b. The increasing futurity of decisions, and
c. Stability and flexibility. Lou^-range decisions
require the maximum of stability yet flexibility
It required to make stability possible.
is concept of management of the whole strikes at the
rt of the methodology which this writer proposes. A parti-
cular "mix" of aircraft purchases for the procurement
appropriation may be optimizing the money hv° liable. But if
this 'iaix M does not optimize the required number of anti-
submarine aircraft needed for the ^nti-eubnarine warfare orogram
or the optimum number of aircraft for the nuclear delivery
program, the Kavy program as a whole will suffer.
go cony Hob11 Oil Company Example
Since there is a parallel In Industry for this line of
thought, a silently extended discussion would be appropriate
at this time. -r. P, C. Salman of Socony Mobil Oil Company,
Inc., addressed the 2Javy Graduate Comptrollershlp Course at
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The George Washington University on January 5, 1961. After
tracing the growth of Socony KoMl, he showed how a changing
business world in the past ten years has necessitated internal
change at Socony. It would be easy to draw an analogy between
the increasing number of competitors and the keener competition
faced by the comnany and the parallel situation faced by the
military services. Perhaps the comparison is better shown by
Kr. Salman himself when he stated:
. . , IvOw just as the KfcVj has adopted to modern
methods and techniques, Socony Mobil has recognized
that changes in our management organization were
necessary to modernize our Company. • felt that
a new plan was needed which would enable us to take
full advantage of today's better means of communica-
tions and improved techniques for analysing and solving
the problems that face ue as managers of a world-wide
enterprise. Improved accounting /machines, electronic
computers, and better communication and travel facili-
ties, plus asany other modern tools, have combined to
make a SINGLE, W0RLD-VI5K management structure advisable
and technically possible.
5
Fundamentally, Socony 's reorganization combines the
management responsibilities previously shared by several
subsidiary companies into a single operating division called
.vobil Oil Company.
The practical effect of this action was to grouc
in nation-wide operating departments each of the
principal functions of our business, the management
of which was previously being carried on by separate
departments in Socony KoMl and each of its domestic
affiliates. 10
"p. C. Salman, Comptroller, Socony Mobil Oil Company,
Inc., in an address before the rtavy Graduate Comptrollership
Program at The George Washington University on 5 January 1961.
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It 1b seen thM ^cony Mfttll'i corporate management, therefore,
functions on the basic philosophy of centralized policy-
making, (Thin fiction parallels the Wavy Department ) • But at
the sane time they did away with their structure of maximizing
departmental profits and developed profit centers. Formerly,
each major activity or function in Socony .>obil was considered
responsible for running its own particular part of the business
at a profit. To measure this profitability of the separate
functions within the business, extensive use was made of inter-
departmental billings.
By upinff this system of interdepartmental billing,
it was thought that the motivation of the former functional
management to maximize depa rtmental profit? resulted in the
highest overall profits att^in^ble for the c ooony KObtl
shareholders. However, in order for functions to have true
profit responsibility, the functional organization unit should
have complete decision-making authority on volume, price, and
cost elements. Since they could not have this authority, it
was considered both unfair and unreasonable to hold departmental
managers responsible for profits.
In addition, this profit responsibility had the effect
of diluting the functional manager's efforts by diverting their
attention from the elements for which they alone were account-
able: for example, in the case of a refinery manager, his
primary concern should be refining expenses and efficient usage
of crude oil and other import materials. Once it was decided
that profit responsibility should not rest in each function,
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it was placed In the profit centers at the division level.
I ithin the profit center, ••tfe sqna?er, whether in
marketing, manufacturing, or pipe-line transportation, is
recognized as making contribution to the totsl profit of the
complex either in the forrr; of controlled or reduced costs or
in the form of increased sales realization. This action also
recognizes that any management affecting the operation should
be viewed in terms of its effect on the total complex rather
than attempting to analyze, as they had been doing in the
function 1 ^rofit and loss system, its effect on each separate
department. One can see that there is great emphasis through-
out the comnany on plltlftg responsibility for decision-making
in the hands of individual aenfcgeri I 11 levels, giving
them appropriate authority ft-Bd yet holding then accountable
for results.
w how does this concept ?pply in principle to the
vj planners and managers? First, it might "be well to point
cut that the Socony Mobil Oil Company in 1959 had sales and
services totaling fcbout |3#5 billions, from about the same
total assets, in p v;orlc:>i'ie operation, so that the size of
the enterprise cannot be considered rma.ll even by &avy Depart-
ment annual expenditures of {12 billions.
Application pf yheory to Practice
To retrogress briefly, it is reiterated that the facet
"Financial and Operating Statistics 1959,"
prepared by The Socony Mobil Cll Conm»ny, Inc.
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of management which is under consideration here is the
forecasting function. Management, of course, involves more
than conceptualization and decision-making. The Justification
of manage&ent requires more than a mental activity— it involvee
action or the stimulation of an action in a more physical sense.
In this light, management is viewed as a process, eventually
measured in terms of group accomplishment. 12 But the restricted
aspect of management envisioned is the employment of resources
to accomplish predetermined objectives. It is felt, however,
that the plan can be executed through the well-established
channels of the "oroducer" system in the Navy by means of an
adequate "feed-back" network.
Instead of having thirty-six or more orogram sponsors
it Is advocated that the managers be reduced to three. The
first would be a manager for operations and maintenance of all
weapons systems; the second would manage all nrocurement of
weapons systems; and the third would be responsible for the
support functions of these systems such as research and develop-
ment projects, military construction projects, reserve forces,
and general administrative functions.
*
In the connotation used here a weapons system complex




, 0. w., Department of the Air Force, The
Management -?roc eps, fcKM 2r-l (feetemper 19$4)<
17
Infra., p. 89. This model is analogous to the one
proposed by - rr. B, L. Jackson end &lc«ussod In Chapter V.
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importance of timely integration of all aspects of a weapons
system from establishment of the operational requirement
through design, development, production, personnel training,
operation and logistic support. At the top level of manage-
ment represented by the three corporate managers, the lines of
distinction between duties and res-oonslbiliticr rv not clearly
fixed. Their corporate decisions, -cv-ever, would determine the
optimum distribution of resources to Leve the proper balance
between the Navy of today and the Ravy of fconerroir, In fact,
their major concern would be the posture of the forces today
and the need to allocate resources for the forces of the future.
Their external sources of guidance would be the economic reports
of the nation, the oolltlcal climate in Congress, the posture
of the other services, the current operational commitments, and
the international situation.
Mow, let us examine the advantages of this centralized
management arouo, *nd then in the next ter we shall develop
some tools and techniques for these managers so that they can
shoulder this tremendous task. These ftdvj ;ea are not all
inclusive but they will show how they support the theory.
1. It permits the develop < nrograis of the
whole with s logical structure.
?. It incorporates i "feed-back" from the results
of the process to seasure the effectives of the decisions.
(This nart of the system is touched upon In subsequent chapters)
3* It is an integrated process to determine relevant
f*cts. A weapons system is not }ust aircraft, ships, missiles,
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or any one end-product. It 1b a whole objective. Thus the
parochial interests of one weapon proponent does not dominate
the resources.
A. The strict method for the decision-making process
will be developed through the use of management science tools.
5. It permits stability but also provides for
flexibility when new developments occur. It also provides
elimination or nhaeing out of weapons systems as they become
obsolescent and are replaced.
6. The solutions are predicated on examining the range
of alternatives, each with its distinct risks.
7. It ensures that the chosen solutions become
effective in action.
8. It permits the preparation of reports showing
actual performance versus planned performance, (This point
will be illustrated later).
9. Top management is placed in the position where
responsible managers can be directed to reduce costs in certain
areas over which they have control. Thus, the former blanket
plea for reducing expenses is exchanged for a eharp instrument
of control.
10. By orienting the "complex" around the weapons system
it facilitates comparison with the other services. If the
weapons system has a dual capacity for nuclear and non-nuclear




Beyond the routine, day-to-day actions of the Chief
of Naval Operations are the decision-making or planning
activities. More and more these activities are becoming
increasingly difficult because of the advances in technology
and the associated rise of costs in the development, procure-
ment, ?nd operations of weapons systems. Over the last 10
years the lines of battle in the Wavy Department have been
drawn. The value judgments of top management up and down the
chain of command have been drawn taut in trying to resolve
insolvable problems.
A new approach to planning is needed. questions must
be developed which transpose the normal or conventional thought
processes. Questions must be developed which cross the known
battle lines of fixation. Questions must be developed which
permit a range of alternative solutions so that one weak
decision does not cause irreparable harm.
Except at the very highest management levels most
decision-makers reserve only a fraction of their effort for
thinking and planning. By far the largest proportion of their
time is spent in mechanical, routine, and repetitive actions.
There is ft need, therefore, for a triumvirate of managers who
have a vision of the whole to plan and gul" > the logistic-type
—^—*—— • ^__-^__ ^-
1 | f tt -nfi-inniw- iwi h i i ii. rwn ir . 1 urm i Mi 11 r 111 1— 11 I m 1 ill 11 11 1 -r" imiui nn nw..nrmiiWJu.u.iLi-T. n m rn 111 11
Cf
.
, Burton V. Dean, "Application of Operations
Research to Managerial Decision Making," Administrative Science
quarterly (December 1958), p. 414.
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operation© which are rapidly becoming the main functions of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The future i4avy
must be planned today. The parts must be closely integrated
to achieve maximum efficiency in the use of resources.
In the next chapter we shall analyze the tools and
techniques available to assist this group of managers. Some
of the precious principles of management of yesteryear will be
'
cast aside, and in their place we shall substitute more power-
ful tools. These tools make it possible for a manager to
encompass more of the problem area and rely less on the limited
capacities of human brssin-DOwer. Ultimately, the gray areas
of doubt will come more into focus so that the creative genius
of the military man will provide an improved national security




In 1959, Mr. E. D. Dwyer, Chief, ^avy Management Office,
wrote J M If we wish to improve management, we should study
management rather than computers."1 In 1961, Mr. Dwyer said;
• do have management know-how, and it is this plus imagina-
tion and work that can oroduce a solution to our problem" (a
position to portray intelligently our oroblems so that necessary
action on i national scale can result). In this chapter, is
charted a course somewhere between these two ideas. Since it
was concluded in Chapter III that a new approach to management
is needed, it would seem wise to study the tools available to
assist management so that the Improved management takes full
advantages of these tools. Also to be examined are some
promising management techniques which have not yet been proven
so that imagination and work on these techniques can be
started. If the improvements are going to be put to practical
use, no less than a five-year projection of ideas must be set
forth because it takes considerable time to program computers
F. D, "vyer, "The Computer Challenge, " Navy Msnagement
Review, IV (August, 1959), p. 3.
o
E. D. Dwyer, "Educational Program Session, An
Address before the Armed Forces Management Association,





and develop the details of the management sciences.
Present Uses of Management Science
-• John A. Beckett, Assistant director of the Bureau
of the Budget, in an address last Kay observed:
The uses of computers may be nut into five major
categories: business management, science, engineering,
military operations and intelligence. In the first of
these categories, business management, we find that
the trend in ADP utilization to date bat been to con-
centrate upon the administrative tyne of system—such
as payroll, personnel accounting, cost accounting,
appropriation accounting, inventory accounting and
the like--while the substantive operations of imny
of the agencies have been ignored or intentionally set
aside for the time beinsr. This kind of imbalance was
to be expected. It is also to be expected that the
agencies will do something about it soon.
3
If we accent these categories rather arbitrarily, the inatten-
tion to business man?gen:ent computers in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations may be analyzed
•
In a report on the use of electronic data-processing
equipment In the Federal Government, nn inventory (as of 3
June I960) of electronic computers in the $avy Department shows
a total of 87 computers compared with 139 for the Air Force
and 134 for the Army. Of these 87 computers QPMAV has one
small, 650 IBM, which is used for flight activity status and
4
naval intelligence. This one small computer then is used for
'john A. Beckett, Address before the Symposium on
Integrated and Automatic Data Processing Systems, Federal
Government Accountant Association, Statler Hilton Hotel, New
York City, Way 2I# I960.
A
U» S. , Congress, House, Subcommittee on Census and
Government Statistics of the Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, Report on the Use of Electronic Data-Processing
culpment in the Federal Government . 86th Cong.. 2nd Sees..
I960, Committee Print, VV» 84-85.
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the duel purpose of business management and intelligence.
Like a balance sheet in accounting this inventory
reflects the statue at that moment* Vihat is being done today
or planned for tomorrow V To give a fair portrayal of the
current thinking and doing, let us briefly look at two programs
which are in various stages of activity In 02*HAV« In the
first place, an aircraft logistic data program is nearly com-
pleted. An interim report in November, 19!: 9, is a good place
to start because: (1) it shows what the problems were when
the study started, and (2) it partially illustrates the manage-
ment planning concept (on a smaller scele) envisioned in
Chapter III.
• conclusions reached in the report based on initial
interviews in the Aviation Plana Division (OF-50):
(1) 0F-5C provides the basic planning data
required by the Integrated Aeronautical Program to
all levels of ftavy, GfcD, Bureau of the Budget, and
Congress.
(2) There is no evidence, either within or without,
of the existence of a system describing the exact flow
and content of this planning data. ( ihe integrated
aeronautical program, 0PMAVJN8T 4110,1 broadly defines
the type of data QUO will furnish to the Bureau of
Aeronautics and A SO.
)
(3) The lack of such a system and schedule has
placed OP-50 in the position of providing their data
to requesting offices in many forms and with multi
assumptions included, with little control over Its
eventual dissemination for planning.
(4) In many cases, one branch within OP-fO is ^
unaware of program data develooed by another branch.
., Department of the liavy, vy management
Office, "Interim Report of .Aircraft Logistics Data ftudy"
dated 13 November 1959, p. 2.
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The analysis of these findings indicated that the effort to
develop projected aircraft programs should be in two phases.
The first phase was to prepare a series of recommendations
aimed at improving the immediate ills which were reached in
the conclusions above. The second phase was
... an examination of the feasibility of utilizing
electronic data processing for the preparation of
planned aircraft Drograms and the design of a
mathematical model for the solution of an optimum
aircraft program including allocation, procurement
requirements, overhaul requirements and alroraft
disposal.
&
Today this second phase is in its final stage, so that soon
a computer will contain the many factors which make up planned
aircraft programs. It will be of assistance to the program
sponsor. This action is a desirable advance, but it still
incorporates the principle of sub-optimization in planning which
is contrary to the vision of the whole.
The second example is only in the embryonlo stage, but
it is definitely oriented to the whole problem of planning. In
order to relate the impact of this project and others, note
these recent words of Mr. Hitch
s
What we need are more precise and comprehensive
estimates of total costs of major weapon systems,
other programs, and activities, related to each of
the principal missions of the Defense Department.
These estimates should include both initial invest-
ment and annual operating costs.
In the case of a major weapon system, for example,
the estimate should include all the costs of the
system beginning with the original research and
extending through development, production, deployment,
and actual operation of the system. In terms of the
existing budget structure, these estimates would
6
Ibid ., p. 3.

Include all costs under the research, development,
test and evaluation title, procurement, construction,
operation and maintenance, and military personnel—
to the extent that these coste can be identified and
associated with a particular system. Furthermore,
the time horizon of the estimate should extend over
the entire life of the system, or at least well into
the operating phase. Finally, the estimates should
be made available to top management early enough in
the life cycle of the system to be of maximum value
in the planning and decision-making process,'
In Figure 5» it can be seen that the Long Range
Objectives Flan is used as a basis for development of the
Navy's Projected Program Objectives and the Department of the
Jiavy Annual Program Objectives. In Figure 4,9 it is evident
that these long-range objectives cover a period from 10-15
years in advance of current planning. Recently, a group of
senior civilian scientists has been added to the Long range
Planning Irouo (OP-93) to develop studies to serve as aids to
planning for the future tfavy. These men will be interested in
relating costs to long-range objectives so that better decisions
can be made. A highly desirable weapons system may be compared
militarily and economically with its competitors and then
compared with other programs which also compete for the total
resources available. As a simple illustration, a weapons system
similar to the Polaris program would have to be funded within
the fiscal limitations. Thus, since it may be necessary to
?C. J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptrol-
ler), an address before the Ceventh National Conference of the
Armed Forces Management Association, Washington, D. C, March 1,
1961.




reduce other programs, this Is the time to plan for these
reductions and not during the frantic twenty-month period of
the budget prooess. The range of alternatives analyzed and
proposed ten years in advance will certainly Improve management
planning. The official document creating this group, called
the Institute of ifaval studies, defines its mission broadly as:
To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in
forecasting the long-range requirements of the
Operating Forces of the i*avy for equipment, material,
personnel, and supporting services. As appropriate,
the Director, IHS, conducts, coordinates, guides, and
requests studies to serve as aides to planning for
the future Navy, In the fulfillment of these duties
the Institute will be given freedom to achieve the
fullest possible objectivity. 1°
Lang-Pange Planning Techniques
Although the last example is not strictly a tool of
management science , it Is a technique for assisting top
management In making decisions. Let us consider a technique
which might incorporate the type of thinking required by the
long Fange Planning Group. We shall relate the technique to
the basic end-product, the weapons system.
To understand the significance and Importance of long-
range plans and programs, remember that modern weapon systems
Involve tremendous costs and their complete life cycle may
extend over many years. I should Imagine, for example, that
the life span of the Polaris weapons system Is about 25 years
including the development phase, production pha*«< and first
10U. S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, ^Director, Institute of Naval Studies,"
OPNAV Instruction 5000. 23A of February 2, 1961.
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line Inventory phase. The Air Force has one weapon system
currently in Its inventory, which has a life ftpia of 22 years.
H
Carl Freeman, who was Assistant for Financial Manage-
ment , Department of the Air Force in 1958, and former
President, Armed Forcefl Keaagestttt Association, wrote:
In recent exercises, Ur Force programs ond oosts
have been projected for a period of nine years. In
Dresentinp the plana ind programs in mission terms,
top management sees the time-phased Imoact of various
Proposals in terms of combat capability, force require-
ments, personnel requirements, Within each command
area a breakdown Is also provided by weapon system.
Through the presentation of alternative plans and
nroposals, top iaana«eiaent can evaluate the combat
capabilities inherent in the various alternatives as
well as the financial feasibility taking1 into con-
sideration economic limitations. ^2
Mr. Freedman then presents two fictitious examples
illustrating first the time period from fiscal year 1981-1989.
Various weapons systems are introduced, others operated and
supported, others phased out. The level of combat capabilities
Is graphically displayed as changes in weapon systems convert
the Air Force into coroolex units. Then he selects one of the
weapon systems, and in the time period FY 1958-196? relates it
to a. program from research and development to personnel require-
ments, financial requirements, and facility requirements. Of
course, the examples are oversimplified for illustrative
purposes, but the basic technique is well founded.
m i I ii » - m i —,,.-.. ii i ii i n ,ii i ii . iii. mm
Carl Freedman, "Long- Range Planning: A Management





In conclusion, Kr« Freedman writes:
. . . It should be noted in passing that the
' rector* te of Ma&ageseat Analysis in the Office of
the Controller of the Air Force has been developing
techniques and uses a high speed electronic comouter
for computations to support olans and programs for
approximately five years. Significant procedural
teehnicues have been developed, Including the TriT
System which provides a generalized system of
computer routiner.!"35
The Ravy does have en overall plan for automatic data
processing. 1 * It covers a thirty-year period from 1940 to 1970.
The thirty years were divided into six, five-year periods.
\ge 5 (the period I960 to 196K ) has eight ways which will
characterize this period. One of these ways is the . . .
shift in emphasis of applications toward the best use of ADF
predominantly in development of plans, rrograirs, budgets,
schedules, and management control actions. . . . ^ Incidental-
ly, Stage 6 (1965-1970) Is a consolidation period and a period
for rejoicing because we shall have achieved an integrated Navy
management information system. It is difficult to accept this
phlloDOphyl
,.ith 2*i of the time period in Stage J already elaosed
,
a technique of developing the objective stated is undetected.
The standard straight- forward approach adopted by the Air Force,
we say, is not applicable to the Havy "because our weapon
13 Ibid ., p. 78.
14
Secretary, jata ?ocessln.g in wy - n agei ent Inf
System s, Sec-iJav Instr. P-16^52.7, lb April 1959.
15





systems, or ships, or aircraft are designed to function under
many different circumstances; and, therefore, it is not
possible to present nlans and urograms in mission terms. Thus
the matter was dismissed I No attempt was made to construct
s model to simulate the multi-ourpoee missions of the end-
products.
This attitude may be too harsh but hardly unjustified
in the fpce of the achievements of management science, As
long ago M lata 1957 • Mr. Fills 4. Johnson of the Operations
Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, developed a
philosophy of planning that ^rrlies to ell parts of our
military system and can be translated to cover other large
scale operations. Kr. Johnson writer:
• • . The foal is planning system that provides
in an orderly, logical way for a continuous and up-to -
date search for solutions based on sound and timely
de'oleiori^makiDg instead o"f blind adherence to five-*
year plans. My proposal is not tied to any specific
organization; rather it focuses on the functioning
of a logical deoir ion-waking system within which
long-range plans are developed. 16
Although the thesis of Mr. Johnson's paper is not the
wisdon which this writer desires to emphasize, the above
quotation is the point of aim of this chapter. The decision-
maker requires all the aid possible from advanced oroblem-
solving procedures, such as operations research, which are now
available. Ae yet, it appears that in 1961, at top management
16
hllis A. Johnson, The Crisis in Science and
Technology and Its iffeet on Military Development,"
Operations Research . VI (January-February, 1958), p. 29,

level too many decision-makers rely fully on the intuitive
methods which were sufficient in the past when the problems
of an enterprise were comprehensible to single human being.
It is especially true that the highly professional, hardthink-
inp, imaginative planners who must screen ideas and proposals
have the tools of science combined with intuition developed
through experience in the various professional fields. As r.
Johnson points out, these tools are particularly necessary so
that the military planner knows which way to turn, what horse
to put hie money on, in the research and development °rea.
Those ideas which aonear fantastic, even ridiculous, today are
real itj tomorrow.
Promising Tools for Decision-Making
There have been developed many techniques for the
methodology of management science. In fact, the havy's slow-
ness to adopt these techniques to management when they were
used so extensively during and since ^orld War II, remains a
mystery which is difficult to explain. As an example, the
minimax theory of mining grew out of v,orld war II experience.
In the operations against Japan, it was thought at first that
saturation mining was necessary to bring the Japanese merchant
marine to a standstill. As the months went by, however, it
was learned that a fev mines, well-placed could produce a
larger number of casualties. ^
'Lieutenant Bo ier A. S« Lott, . ' , ost Dangerous





e principle of the minlmax theory applied In a
mining r IgE |l simple. The objective is to maximize enemy
casualties (rink shins) with the minimum number of nines. Let
there be no mistake, however, in believing that all of the
variables are known or can be learned through naval intelligence!
Indeed, there may bt fti many unknowns ae a businessman faces in
making? ut> a foreeaat. But it is also true that good
reasoning by the alnlng stre legist will improve his results
particularly at the beginning of the operation. As long as these
variables remain within certain, rather broad, Units results
arc pretSletafela.
To carry the mlninp, illustration a step forward, the
gavltig theory may be employed . After the initial delivery of
the mines, the reaction of the enemy || observed. If he
follows one course of action—his option, tlic vining strategist
counters by striking fell most vulner^bl daces. When the
enemy moves to cover those Hurts* other? are mined. And so
the ffsmlng theory is played to exhaustion and ultimate starva-
tion of the enemy country.
The advantage of this operational planning using
oneratlons-research methods is that any officer schooled in
the basic princinles may annly these principles, and under a
similar situation any other officer may develop approximately
the same end-repult, Kence the element of chance is reduced,
and the value jv&guant of an Individual is subordinated to
the overall objective. o concepts are readily illus-
trated in antisubmarine warfare where the tactics for a
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"lost contact" by .« destroyer results immediately in going into
certain search patterns: based upon known factors such as the
elapsed til ice contact was lost many variable, unknown
factors such as the submarine's speed, course, depth. iy
Ttoif paper docs not purport to 91 • operations
research at flawless science, There <are many pitfalls*
But ©very d^y these faults ^re being examined and in some cases
solved. Again, in exavpl* of military operations is most
easily described. stud-' iiich relate to decisions affecting
the course of possible military operations in the distant
future *^re confronted by the fcmiliar pitfalls of operations
research iu a partioularly aggravate form due principally to
the broad context ir: ivhich such decisions typically appear.
The alternative to the whole vision of the 'bro^d context" is
ttb~«ptijfiizati9ni whiefi is *f undesirable in military opera-
tions §j it is in eenageaeiit long-range pi annlng*
In I psper presented at the Sixteenth ^etioncl meeting
of the Operations Research Society of -merica et Pasadena,
California, on lioveaber 12, 1959, jr. Doug-las L. Brooks, of
the Raval fttffftyt taalyslfl droup discussed means, (1) for
avoiding undesirable sub-ootiaization, and (2) for including
the effects of significant constraints when choosing criteria
jtf*» Florence ..:. irefethen, A History of Operations
Research," Operations Research for Man^p-ement, ed, Joseph
Pi . euloskey and Florence h. Irefethen (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Frer , ro. 5*35«
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on which to base long-range planning decisions. * The long-
range operations research philosophy advocated by Or. Brooks
was;
... to research all things, develop many, and
procure few. It is preferable to hedge your bets
against the future rather than stake all on a purely
fictitious 'optimum'. In long-range planning the
best really is the enemy of both the better and the
good. However, it is clear we cannot afford to look
for the better or the good either in I 'grab-bag 1
or in a 'pork barrel'. .here we ought to look and
how successful we are likely to be in finding what we
need depend critically on the proper choice of PaY~
offs for the systems and forces being considered.*^
Several new measures of merit are presented which
emphasize the feature of research and development leverage
over potential enemy counterme3sure developments. For deci-
sions affecting possible near-term military operations, it ie
suggested that operations-research studies can profitably
emphasize the optimization of (a) deployment of existing
forces, and (b) military decisions dealing with force composi-
tions and systems development. The difference is particularly
acute in the selection of criteria, or the choice of pay-offs,
a matter absolutely critical for studies of military operations
of the future.
In this discussion of the techniques of management
science, there is pointed out the use of the mlnlmax theory
^Douglas l. Brooks, "choice of Pay-Offs for Military
Operations of the Future," Operations Research
. vIII





and game theory. There has also been set forth a concept of
long-range planning based on a choice of pay-offs. It is
interesting to note that these are the very ideas which Secre-
tary Hitch may employ in management science techniques for
balancing defense and resources. Mr. Hitch uses slightly
different terms but essentially his methods for improving the
indications of performance in the Department of Defense are
similar. He describes them as: (1) changes in force structure,
(2) the enemy's response, and (3) changes in designated
capabilities. 2* It is felt that the reader can relate these
factors to the thoughts expressed by Dr. Brooks.
With these quantitative approaches there is no doubt
that Mr* Hitch will be faced with a. multitude of alternatives
when he makes his recommendations to .r. ; .c£iamara. vshen one
analyzes these broad concepts over a wide range of capabilities,
weapons systems, resources, to name only a few, the range of
alternatives becomes almost infinite. This means that the
incorporation of these techniques will improve the present
system of value judgments, but it will hardly solve the problem
of optimum defense for a minimum expenditure of funds. Nor
will the long-range planner reach his optimum objectives through
quantitative methods.
One technique, however, for reducing the range of
alternatives is to question the validity of operations-research
studies. Since operations research is concerned with conducting
21Hitch and McKean, pp. 61-64.
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studies to help the decision-maker make better decisions, and
since operations research deals with the future, it is in the
nature of the decision process that there will always be
uncertainties, ~ince the information on which decisions are
based may be incomplete, the operations-research nrocess may
provide information to fill some of these gaps. An essay by
Walter J. :.'tr'j.uss of the Institute of Mr Weapons Research,
University of Chicago, sets forth arguments that permit one to
Judge the reliability of the information provided by an
operations-research study, that is, to judge its validity, 2 *
Another approach to reducing the limitations or dis-
advantages associated with operations-research systems or
analysis is presented by J. W. Ellis and T, E. Ireene of Tae
Rand Corporation, A known limitation in operations research is
the nonquantifiable variables, such as political factors. Such
variables obviously interact with the military factors in a
complex fashion. Ihe relation is dynamic so that political
and military problems cannot be separated at times, and this
relation changes continually throughout the course of a war.
r. Ills and Mr. Qreene have examined a structured analytical
method termed "contextual study," whereby the military and
political factors of the environment of a limited war are
22
Walter J. Strauss, "The Mature and Validity of
Operation-Research Studies, "with Emphasis on Foroe Composi-




considered simultaneously throughout a campaign or series of
campaigns. 23 Applications to other types of problems than
limited war—problems Involving close interaction among.
quantifiable and nonquantifiable factors are suggested.
Several areas are mentioned In which a contextual approach
would seem appropriate to problems involving strong admixtures
of political, social, or psychological factors into otherwise
quantitative situations.
We have no* progressed from the conventional approaches
suggested by the minlmax theory and the gaming theory to
refinements which avoid undesirable sub-optimization, to those
which provide a means to Judge the validity of operations
research, and which incorporate quantifiable and nonquantifiable
factors in problems. Let us now look at techniques for solving
ill-structured problems. It is quite likely that top
management in the ;<iavy would quickly point out that decisions
at this level are ill-structured and Incapable of being
structured so that they are not susceptible of the conventional
techniques of operations research, ^uch a sophisticated
approach is heuristic problem solving. Heuristic is a word
applied to arguments and methods of demonstration which are
persuasive rather th#n logically compelling.
A problem is well-structured to the extent that it
satisfies theee criteria:
2*5
J. W. Ellis and T. E. C-reene, "The Contextual
Study: A Structured Approach to the Study of Political and
Military Aspects of Limited War," Operations Research . VIII
(September-October, I960), pp. 639-51.
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a. It can be described in terms of numerical
variables, scalar =snd vector quantities.
b. The objectives are specified in terms of a well-
defined objective function (mlnimax theory).
c. There exist algorithms that permit the solution
to be found and stated in actual numerical terms
(maximization procedures in calculus, linear-
progrftWilng ftl$tritnmi like the simplex methods
and Monte Carlo techniques).
In other words, well-structured oroblems can be formulated
explicitly and quantitatively and are then solved by known
and feasible conmutatlonnl techniques .*-H
Problems are ill-structured when they are not well-
structural . In some oases, for example, the essential
variables are not numerical ?.t all, but symbolic or verbal.
An officer who is drafting a logistic policy is searching for
words, not numbers. Secondly, there ere many important situa-
tions in planning where the objective function— the goal
—
is vague and nonquantitative. In Chanter II, it was observed
that there was a translation of tasks Into action because the
Projected Program Objectives document states its programs in
preneral terms. 2 - How do we evaluate the quality of the Navy
training system or the effectiveness of an antisubmarine warfare
££•» Herbert A, Simon and Allen Newell, "Heuristic
Problem Solving: The $ext Advance in Operations Research,"
Operations Research
. VI (January -February, 1953), dp. 4-5.
2C
-' Supra
, w* 29, 32.

73
task group? Thirlly, there are many practical problems for
which computational algorithms rve not available. For example,
is weapons system A more efficient under a variety of situa-
tions than weapons system E?
Dr. Simon and Dr. Newell in one of their earliest
articles on heuristic problem Giving aade these predictions;
Operations research has made lar^e contributions to
those management decisions that can be reduced to
systematic computational routines. To date, comparable
progress has not been made in applying scientific
techniques to the judgmental decisions that cannot
be so reduced. Research of the past three years into
the nature of complex information process in particular,
is about to change this state of affairs radioally.
We are now poised for a surest advance that will bring
the digital computer and the tools of mathematics and
the behavioral sciences to bear on the very core of
managerial activity on the exercise of Judgment and
intuition; on the protested of -inking complex
decisions. 26
As we defined decision-making in Chapter III, it
Involves much more than the final choice among possible
courses of action. 27 xt relates to detecting the occasions for
decisions and directing the organization's attention to them.
Secondly, it involves developing possible problem solutions-
range of alternatives—among which the final choice can be
made, naturally, when we think of decision-making we think of
this final choice. Actually, much more management effort is
allooated to attention-directing functions and to investigation,
fact gathering, design, and the development of the range of
alternative .
2





-s BOH in the early stss.es of a technological
revolution of the :2ecl3ion-«aking process. That revolution
h^s two aspects, one considerably further advanced than the
other. The first aspect, which is concerned largely with
decisions close to the orogragreed end of the continuum, has
been referred to earlier in this chapter as operations research
or management science. The second aspect which we are examining
now is the set of techniques that are now generally known as
heuristic programming.
at is the significance of this second aspect? It is
significant because it makes the statement, "Computers are
Just very e aronc for carrying out arithmetic calcula-
tions"—a half-truth. Thic statement belongs to that class of
v if- truth- t ar« Important just because their implications
tare BO > irleadinr. v. Limon in a recent book has made four
categorical statements about computers:
1. Computer?, art very general devices capable
of manipulating all kinds of symbols-words as
readily as numbers. . . .
2. Computers behave like morons only because w©
are just beginning to learn how to communicate with
them in something better than moronic language. . . .
3« Computers do only what you program them to
do in exactly the same sense that humane do only
what their penes and their cumulative experiences
program them to do. • . •
4* It has now been demonstrated, by doing it,
that computers can be programmed to solve relatively
ill-structured nroblems by using methods very similar
to those used by humans in the same problem-solving
situations: that is, by highly selective trial-and-
error search using all ports of rules of thumb to
guide the selection; by abstracting from the given
problem and solving first the abstracted problem;
by using analogy; by reasoning in terms of means
and ends, goals and subgoals; by adjusting aspirations
to the attainable. ere is no longer reason to
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regard phenomena like ' judgment * and 'insight'
as either unanalyzable or unanalyzed, for, in
some forms at least, these phenomena have been
simulated—computer e have exercised Judgment
and exhibited insight, 28
We cannot pause here to develop these thoughts, but in
order to present briefly some insight to these statements,
John W. Carp, III, former President of the Association for
Computing Machinery and a member of the University of Michigan,
Department of Mathematics, wrote in 1958:
Digital computer users have learned, during the
past ten years, that oddly enough, the main use for
these new information machines may not be as computers
at all but rather as 'symbol manipulators.' As a
symbol manipulator, evaluating and interpreting
symbols from its own environment, the digital
computer may be able to perform its most spectacular
jobs .29
These ordered and meaningful sequences of symbols are
what human beings call languages. Cobal . Software , Fortran ,
and Algol are so-called compiling techniques that instruct
computers in general language very similar to the ordinary
language of mathematics. From this point we proceed to ohess
playing where the computer may lose a few games but by evaluat-
ing its own mistakes, Its game improves .30 in addition, with
28H@rbert A. Simon, "The Corporation J Will It B«
Managed by Machines?* Management and Corporations 1985 . ed.
Melvin Anshen and 3. L. Bach (tfeu York; ^McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., I960), pr>, 44-46.
29^John W. Carr, III, "Computer Programmers Must Turn
Theory into Reality," The Office (January, 1953), pp. 109-110,
30
A. Newell, J. C. Shaw, and H. A. Simon, "Chess-
playing Programs and the Problem of Complexity," IBM Research
and Development Journal
. II (October, 1958), od. 3^0-35.
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these compilers, we can now program « computer to evaluate a
formula by writing down little more than the formula itself
and the instruction to act. As one step in the study of
intelligent behavior in machines, researchers have considered
the particular case of a machine that can prove theorems in
elementary EXaclldean plane geometry. The device uses no
advanced decision algorithm, but relies rather on rudimentary
mathematics and ingenuity in the manner of a clever high-school
student.^
Lest the reader believe that these ideas are "gimmicks"
(the talking computer, the chess-playing machine), let us note
that considerable work is being done on a general problem
solver. Although it is not as general as its name suggests,
it is entirely free from reference to any particular subject
natter and is, in fact, a quite flexible scheme for reasoning
about any subject in terms of goals and subgoals. The general
problem solver is a program for a digital computer. It is
part of an investigation into the extremely complex processes
that are involved in intelligent adaptive and creative behavior.
The principal means of Investigation is synthesis: programming
large digital computers to exhibit intelligent behavior, study-
ing the structure of these computer programs, and examining
problem-solving and other adaptive behavior that the programs
31
H. L. Gelernter and N. Rochester, Intelligent
Behavior in Jroblem-Solvlng Machines," IBK Journal of Research
and Development




Let us be clear on one point. Henrietta progrsmc do
not merely substitute ftaohlnt brute force for human cunning.
Increasingly, they irritate—and in some cases improve upon—
human cunning. Beme people would claim that cheps-playlne,
for example, is KH structural and nrorcrrmrred than the
nroblems of everyday life. forfe**! 1% is, although the point
could be debs ted. -n/ev«r, it ' fficiently temples,
sufficiently rich in alternatives , sufficiently irregular in
structure that it poses the ease kinds of Bifficultiee and
requirements to the computer that arc. pretested { perhaps, to
a hirner ?ncrree) by ill- r true turn* proble.TS in general. In
Dr. Simon's o\;n words:
Hence, the fact that chess programs, theorem-
proving programs, music- composing programs, and a
factory-scheduling program now exist indicates that
the conceptusl mountains that barred us from
understanding how the human mind grapples with
every day affaire have been crossed, fto major
new ideas will have to be discovered to enable
us to extend these early results to the whole of
human thinklag, problem-solving-., decision-making
activity. We have every reason to believe that
within I very short time
—
perhaps ten years or
less—we will be technically able tc produce
computers that can p-ranple with *?nc solve at
least the range of problems that humans are able
to grapple with and solve. 33
Summary
In this chanter we have seen some of the tools and
* C A. Hewell, J. C. Shaw, and B. A. Simon, ' / General
Probiem-rolving Program for a Computer," ^orrputc-rs and
Automation
. VIII (July, 1959), pp. 10-16,
and I
33
-^Herbert A, Simon, Management by machine, hov. ^uch
low Doon?" ?he Management review (November, I960), p. 74.

78
techniques available to aid the planner. We have examined in
part the continuum from highly programmed decisions in
operational planning to the unprogrammed decisions more
generally associated with once-for-all decisions of the long-
range planner. Between these two extremes lie decisions with
every possible mixture of programmed and non-programmed, well-
structured and ill-structured, routine and non-routine elements.
With this range of decisions go the tools and techniques of
4
tried and true method? of operations research, to contextual
studies in nonquantlfiable factors, to heuristic problem
solving. The planner must, however, tell the management
scientist and researcher what he needs to do his job most
effectively. But first of all the manager-planner must create
a conceptual model of the whole.

CHAPTER V
A HEW MANAGE^EtiT-PLACING SCIENCE
Ith the progress in the provinces of management science
and heuristic problem solving the veaknesses in the ftavy
planning System may be reduced and OPMAV may be reshaped to fit
the nation's defense structure. It would be useless to modify
the present system because it adheres too closely to the strict
disciplines of the principles of management. The present
organization chart stifles the initiative and the thinking of
management because of its complexity. The staff and line
relationships must not be so restrictive that it becomes
necessary to fit the staff specialist in without antagonizing
the line, 1 Urwick*** arguments would suppress the vision of the
whole and place too many limitations on the managers and plan-
ners who already have a difficult task.
At this time when Kr« i'loftamara is strengthening
civilian control and moving to centralize authority,^ the Navy
must demonstrate that it too has the best interest of the
entire military establishment in its managerial concepts. The
1 Lynd?»ll v. Urwlck, "Fitting in the Specialist Without
Antagonizing the Line," Readings in Management , ed. Harold
Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Inc., 1959), PP. 132-39.





Air Force is already beginning a major chancre in its organisa-
tion for managing development, basic research, and general
procurement. The avowed 9im of the revamping is to centralize
direction of major programs and give closer attention to
military space projects. The revisions seek to effect more
efficient management and swifter decisions by consolidating all
work on development and procurement of planes and missiles in
a new command to be called the Air Force Systems Command.
^
.Xne.Qble^tlve
In this chapter is outlined concepts developed so that
they operate to attain the objectives of a centralized managerial
concent. Therefore, let us list those objectives so that the
factors which bear may support the goals.
1. The planning function in OPNAV should support the
strategic planning of the Joint Chiefs of ctaff, the administra-
tion of the Secretary of Defense, the operational commitments
of the various unified and specified commands, and the goals
of the Wavy Department.
2. It must operate within the organization and
management of the Secretary of Defense and be closely integrated
with the objectives of the other services.
3. It must be sensitive to the external pressures of
the time, such as the economic, political, social, and
psychological factors. In this regard it should be flexible
enough to adjust to changes quickly and orderly.
^The Wall street Journal (;? stern Edition),
March 22, 1961, p. 6.
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4. The planning function must incorporate the vision
of the whole fiaTjr bo that it aide the Chief of Kay*l Operations
in his decision-making process. His decisions must be ones
which are the best for the entire Kavy and not parochial or
self-centered. Sub-optimization should be avoided wherever
possible,
5. The planning process must be compatible with the
execution of the programs and at the same time compatible with
the budget process in formulation and execution,
The plan envisioned here Is not cure for all the ills
of the Department of Defense or of the Navy Department. It
does not resolve General Taylor's contention that our military
planning is frozen to the requirements of general war nor the
contention that the weaknesses en the Joint Chiefs of Steff
system have left the planning; of our military strategy to civi-
lian amateurs end the budret-mekers. These problems, however,
are under consideration today, and the JUavy must be prepared
to implement whatever policies result.
In Chapter III, 6 triumvirate of top-level planners wag
proposed. These officers would be supported by the variety of
ftidt in the continv.un of the declsion-makinp- urograms. Their
primary aim would be to interpret, describe, coordinate and
balance the Tisslors assigned to the Bavy, Ike initial decisions
4
ner^l Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet
(New York: Harper & Brothers,' Publishers, 1959).
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by this board would be based on their beet value Judgment. But
like the purpose of the gaming theory the final decisions
would not be made until the solutions had been completely
tested through the range of alternatives. Like chess playing
programs a large computer could examine one million alternative
possibilities, evaluating them on the basis of simple, perhaps
crude criteria, until the beet selection appears. Clearly,
the human mind could not move in this manner.
But what will the program UBe for ohessmen? By means
of model simulation the researcher could undoubtedly conceive
a system or model to achieve the objective. Since Mr. D. L.
Jackson has spent a year and a half constructing such model
to suit the budget orocese, and sinoe there is other evidence
to support a product mission concent,* let up for now adopt the
weapon system (as Mr. Jaekson did) M the device which may be
used to sccorrnlish thie evaluation. This action will ensure
compatibility with the budget process (Objective 5) and define
an aiming point for planning and controlling functions of top
management.
Figure 7 shows the decision oattern which starts with
developing the long-range concepts. This crroun would be
responsible for gathering all facts which bear on the future
planning of the Navy. They would nr^nsre the lon^ range charts,
graphs, and other displays which reoulre the integration of the
'Jim Rosenzweig, The Weapon Systems ement
Concept and Flectronic Data «-roceesirig, H v. gement cclence
.




































weapons pyptems with the missions. They would develop their
data based on the same economic factor sub-groupings as
the control functions.^ he range of alternatives would then
be presented to the triumvii t the (top) level of decision
for initial lotion, t-rvrril alternatives woul :1 be selected
for further testing. - ae alternatives would be studied
through the aiming and planning cycle indicated in the left-
hand position of Figure 3. Tnii step would be to refine the
decision-making process and. to Define problem areas caused by
design, production, delivery, end utilization. The final step
would be the identification of areas of duplication and conflict
with current planning. Obviously, these, steps would require
the accuir.ulr.tian of a tremendous amount of data end the
continuous development of techniques to express ever- changing
concepts. But it would permit the alternatives to be checked
through the entire management cycle before implementation.
In order to get the |-o-ohesd from top management for an
overall re-evaluation and redesign of the current system caused
by breakthroughs in technology or shifting emphasis in missions,
current and ai4-range planning msy be revamped. But these
changes would be fully analyzed before top ma as srement decisions
would evaluate these changes, for the long-range systems
analysis to work it must be r>rooerly established at this high
level to facilitate the considerable amount of revamping that
may be needed. Only In this way will the vast potential of the
m i— in m———
»














(0 » • 00
TJ CO 4J c
M <y to t< 00
ttj > 4J *J d
T3 t4 CO CO iH
g U 00 >
CO U A 4) oU 0) CO r-« u
CO •«->
§ <u a.XI T3 a
60 o rH co
C a «
*d 60 >t A CO
XJ c 00 O >» ©
CO t4 d «H u u
•H U •H i-( •H 3
r-4 4J > o M *o
JQ «U O a 0)
CO CO 14 jd u
u Ou 60 -U



























electronic computer and the management sciences be realized.
iementation of these loaf-range objectives must
be under the control of these s«me managers in order to make
the above analysis function properly. The present program
>nsor Had program coordinators would be eliiiiln^ted so that
any one weapon systems would not be sub-optimized. ihe managing
group would Issue instructions directly to the bureau managers
who would not modify programs without first checking with the
planning managers. o program managers in the bureaus may
disco ver th>t an increased Droductlon of a weapons system or
a component of the system might reduce costs , out this cost
reduction m--y not be in the best interest of the total planning.
In converting the long-ran^e plane to current planning,
the managing group woula mske extensive use of the extension of
(Program Evaluation and Review Technique), as a system
management tool. In the approach , the development program
is first portrayed prephically as a network of interrelated
activities necessary to achieve prescribed milestones or events.
The PERT system flow plan or network and the critical path in
the system flow plaJB would be worked out. The extension of
this system to coctr would also be determined.' kt the same
time, manpower and training information would be developed to
support the weapon system. The extension of the line of balance
'D. G. Malcolm, "Extensions and Application of PERT
as a fystem Kanag+ffiftBt Tool," An address delivered at The Armed
Forces Management Association, Seventh National Conference,




technique developed by the $avy Management Office for the
Q
olarls missile training program is a good example. These
techniques plus others would be considered in the long-range
planning, revised in the mid-range and placed in final form
for the current planning for budget formulation snd execution.
The centralization of the decisions at this high level
ensures that the "profit center", the allocation of resources,
is always compared with the total defense effort by the riavy
and the other services. As observed by Socony ^obil Oil
Company, this concept could, not have been achieved ten years
ago when the new aids to management were yet undeveloped. This
reorganization combines the management responsibilities
previously shared by many program sponsors into a single group.
9
The execution Is less complex, however, because the "middle
management" level in OPNAV has been removed. It also provides
for a single point of contact for the program managers in the
bureaus and for the fiavy Comptroller. Finally, top management
has created an atmosphere conducive to long-range planning and
has built a communication model for the operation. As current
programs develop the day-to-day situation is accumulated In the
computers so that a "trial balance" may be frequently calculated
for the status of current and future planning.
8
£. D. Dwyer, "Educational Program feseion," An
address before the Armed Forces Management Association,







In looking at the control aspects of Havy Management,
It is understood that the Navy Comptroller Is a separate group
from OPKAY. In other words, the right-hand portion of Figure 7
is generally a function of the Navy Comptroller. Mr. Jackson's
model for control is constructed so that it will fit the
functional budgeting which Mr. Hitch is expected to institute
in the Department of Defense. In Figure 9, the cost of the
/y for any time period Is a function oft
1. Weapons systems being operated.
2. Weapons systems being bought.
3« Indirect support and level of effort.
The phrase, "weapons systems being operated," refers
to the operation and maintenance costs of a weapon system.
In principle, it is no different than the presently used
appropriation "Operation and Maintenance, $avy" except that
these costs are directly attributable to a specific weapons
system such as the Polaris weapon. In Figure 10, the direct
support would be comprised of the nuclear-powered submarines
with their polaris missiles. (If aircraft or submarine tenders
are Involved they would be included also. So Marine Corps
divisions would be considered}. The building blocks associated
with the operational costs of the submarines would be the pay
and allowances of the crews, the value of supplies consumed,
including ammunition and the overhaul and repair costs to
maintain the boats. A further breakdown of repair costs might

































































































































































































































for restricted (unexpected) repairs between overhauls. These
costs are called direct costs (left-hand side of Figure 10);
support costs are shovro on the right-hand side of Figure 10.
To parallel the direct costs of the submarines therre elves would
be the support costs for these boats such as medical costs,
supply costs, and training costs. Medical costs might include
the two blocks of hospitalization of personnel, and all other
medical costs such as shipboard medical or base medical support.
Supply costs would be compiled from the basic supply system
represented by the ship's purchases of necessary stores such
as food, equipment, and services. Other supply support would
be items which are purchased from other than ship's funds and
supplied to the submarines for installation or use. Training
costs for personnel would be the basic or recruit training for
officers and enlisted men and special training such as advanced
schools, submarine training exercises in firing missiles,
arming drills, and others.
The second accumulation of costs would be for the
procurement costs of weapons systems (Figure 9). Here again
these costs are divided Into direct and support costs. In the
procurement of all ships, aircraft, and weapons systems there
are three phases: the first is basic research and development
in bringing the system from conception to prototype; second is
the test and evaluation when the prototype is examined to
determine that it performs according to expectation; finally,
the weapons system is placed in production. These costs are so
































as navigational aids might be available in stock from procurement
funds such 8 8 the Wavy Stock Account; while torpedoes tubes or
sonar equipment might be available from special ordnance fund
accounts. These later two categories would be supported from
the broad base supply support but would be identified with and
accounted for in a particular weapons system procurement. The
supply support could be on a revolving fun3 basis In this case.
Finally, the third category would be the accumulation
of costs which are not readily attributable to either of the
first two costs because they cannot be identified with one
particular weapons system (Figure 12). In fact, these costs
may support one or more systems or even all of the systems.
To pro-rate these costs among the weapons systems would not be
feasible or equitable; therefore, they would be controlled
collectively much as factory overhead is managed in an extremely
large Industry. This category is entitled, "Level of Effort,"
because it will satisfy the objective set by top management in
regard to fleet support. For example, if It is felt that a
Polaris submarine should be able to load stores, missiles,
ammunition, affect repairs, receive personnel any time day or
night at all current I*aval bases in the world, it is obvious
that military construction project costs and the administrative
and operational costs at all shore installations would be
extremely high to provide this high level of service. If this
level of effort is needed only at selected ports, the costs are
reduced. In a similar manner, the status of reserve forces
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forces, and the research and development cost? associated with
this broad support effort would be calculated based on the
urgency of the project.
From b study of these figures and the principles of
accumulating cost, it may be seen that this model aids
decision-making in this fashion:
1. If various alternatives of present and future force
structures, and policies on research, construction, and reserves,
are given, then total cost budgets can be quickly estimated by
electronic data processing for rapid comparison of these
alternatives.
2. If various alternative urogram adjustments to
current or projected budgets are given for the entire Navy or
for segments such as task forces, financial impact of these
adjustments can be quickly estimated by electronic means to
aid in decision-making,
3. If the composition of task forces to perform a
specific function such as anti-submarine, hunter-killer
operation is given, the cost of that function can be quickly
accumulated by electronic data processing machines for preli-
minary budgeting or for cost-effectiveness comparison.''-
. Jackson has constructed his model to be compatible
with the appropriation structure and the functional bud^etin?
exoected to be established in the Department of Defense*
10
D. L. -Jackson, An address before the Navy Graduate




The OPNAV managing grouo would use this model to analyze and
relate their orooosed costs so that their decisions err
realistic and attainable within the resourcer . In addition,
they would direct their questions, r^nge of alternatives, their
solutions, and their decisions toward the 'Viv^ns' 1 listed above.
It is again observed that some portions of this model
and any models related to it will be well- structured and some
ill- structured. But the tools and techniques described in
Chapter IV are available to aid the rcsnagir.g grouo.
Summary
It is not possible in this paper to enumerate the many
facets of the management-planning science envisioned. The
main thesis, however, has generally been aimed at a new
ro:;ch, a new emphasis on planning. This idea embraces an
nroaeb to planning which is quite different from the opera-
tional type of planning which is going on today. The concentra-
tion of responsibility and authority in OPMV could not be
achieved without the management aids developed in recent years
nor could these ideas thrive except in a management atmosphere
euch fti the one being created by Mr. xMcftamara,
The central theme is the necessity for management to
adapt to major changes in their internal and external environ-
ments la the next twenty-five years. Across-the-board knowledge
in every field of study reveals a. dynamic evolution in the
years ahead. A new technology of decision-making is beginning
to raise critical questions sbout adaptation in the organization
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structure and to the functions of managers. It poses equally
critical questions about the effect on human beings of a new
order of man-machine relationshlo. How creatively management
in the wavy can respond to these demands will determine the
character and even perhaps the existence of our wavy.-*--1-




tont ? nd Corpora tion s
,
1g35 « M*« Melvin ft nab en and d, L.
Bacht (Hew York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, I960), op. 199-238.

CHAPTER VI
This thee 1b began by assessing recent events which are
affecting Navy management. Legislative and administrative
pressures are forcing the Chief of Naval Operations to make a
careful reappraisal of the relationship of his office to the
military establishment as a whole and to the Navy Department
in particular. Is his office today nrimarily concerned with
strategic, operational, logistical, or program planning?
There is sufficient evidence that strategic planning and
onerational planning ere more closely associated with the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff than they
are with the Chief of Uaval Operations. This change in
administration warrants a new definition of the primary
objectives of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
A second factor which relates to llavy management is
the economic impact of defense spending. Not only must this
spending in peacetime be kept within reason, but also it must
be more nearly correlated with efficiency. In 194? t Mr.
i;-ooney wrote;
The fact is that an army or navy, because of
the cortf.itions waAtft which tt Cptratftt, must be
supremely efficient, when we consider that the
group rust carry on even when it is literally
shot to pieces we re&lize that here is the moot




coord ins tion of effort. It likewise explains why
the efficiency of an army or navy demands an
intensity of discipline beyond anything demanded
in other spheres. The general frxct remains,
however, that the efficiency of any fori of
organization depends on the measure of its
discipline, and this truth finds in military
organization its outstanding illustration. The
stupendous effort and performance of ,<orld Ifar II
demonstrated the efficiency of military organization
aad justifies the search for anything in iii spirit
or its structure that can be applied in other spheres.
The truth of Rr« ^ooney's statement Iv self-evident still. But,
in addition, there is no doubt thot a country cpxi be lost
through subversion, political coup d 'et^t, psychological
defeatism, or economic chaos. In order to ensure that the
economic condition of our government remains on an even keel
the efficiency of military organization takes on a larger
connotation than a purely operational meaning.
As the technological changes develop r^idly, and as
the weapons of war Increase in complexity, the cost of warfare
grows to gigantic proportions. In fact, this cost is so
large that It presents a threat to our national security as
great as an absence of weapons does. Therefore, it becomes
necessary to develop measures or standards to balance efficiency
and economy. These standards will, if the desires of • r.
McNsmara and Mr, Hitch prevail, equate the cost of weapons
systems to the total resources available. In order to maintain
a strong Navy, top management must be ready to prove not only
the operational capabilities of Its weapons, but also the
1James D. Kooney, The Principles of Organization
(New Tarkl Harper A Brother? M>ii shirs, W47)1, p. 1jV->.
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comparetire economic so vantages of these systems. No longer
can the Wavy hide behind the facade of multiple functions of
its weapons systems and assert that these varied functions
sake economic tvYlfcatifta impractical.
The contention, therefore, is that the management
function in OPKAV ie gaining importance. The Army Chief of
Staff has long since divorced himself from operational duties
and devoted his attentions to logistic planning and advisory
functions. So must the Chief of Naval Operations I Since the
logistic and program Planning are becoming dominant, a clearer
and larger role must be given to these functions * No longer
should the concepts of operational planning be adapted to
program planning, but rather a new planning method must be
devised to suit t different concept of management.
The second focus of this thesis is an extension of the
relationship between efficiency and economy. If resources are
limited in peacetime--as they are—then it behooves the Navy
to develop a planning system which is farslghted in settinsr
long-range goals and yet near-sighted enough to handle current
objectives. ; ince these Ideas may at times be at odds one
with the other, it is necessary to build into planning some
calculated risks. Every effort must be made to maximize the
resources and yet minimize the risk. This idea correctly
suggests that the economics of defense and the task of making
military decisions are Interlocked. Thus, the Chief of Naval
Operations, as the senior naval advisor, must ensure that the
management of the Kavy programs at the present time and in the
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future accomplishes both the military and the economic
objectives.
This management must be concentrated— it cannot
function properly if it is stretched over an operational
framework. The development of the present urogram objectives
are distorted in the first instance when they are translated
from the war plans; and then again when they are translated
into end-products. These distortions have many causes such
as complexity of the ilavy consumer-producer organization,
day-to-day concern with execution of programs, sub-division
of duties and responsibilities in OFNAV, parochial viewpoints
of some officers, budget process pressures, and appropriation
requirements. Only because of the professional knowledge,
resourcefulness, and personal contact of the personnel is
the current end-result passable.
Fortunately, at a time when the demand for a new
system of managerial planning arises, and as the complexities
of program planning increase, management tools and techniques
are becoming available to alleviate these pressures. During
the decade of the 1950's, many groups in the management science
field and the behavioral science field have been studying,
'
n
? lyzing, defining, testing, and evaluating the decision-
making process. In 1955, Kr. John McDonald wrote, "Businessmen
are remarkably candid about their own inability to analyze the
act of decision." 2 In I960, Professor Simon states "Decision
?John McDonald, "How Businessmen Make Decisions,"
Fortune (August, 1955)* p. 85.
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making comprises three principal phases i finding occasions for
making a decision; finding oossible courses of action; and
choosing among courses of action. '"* With this simple beginning
Dr. Simon tr&ees the revolution now being shaped by new
instruments of raanageuent, in which the decision-making process
is becoming so clearly defined that electronic computers can be
programmed to imitate the mechanics of human thinking. This
breakthrough In the decision-making process permits a better
understanding of management functions.
The continuum of available tools and techniques is
broad indeed. The mathematical tools of operations resesrch
are growing each day to incorporate areas of decision-making
which until recently were thought to be applicable only to the
human brain. The calculated risks of the rainlmax theory which
were formerly v^.revvv.d for operational doctrine are found to be
adaptable to military long-range planning as well. Such con-
ventional, test^ technicrues 'ire now being developed to embrace
nonquantiflable factors si; oh as riollticaT and economic factors.
Other tools 'To being forged to aid decision-makers to improve
their decision so that uncertainties of the future <°ro better
v
^ndied. Finally, the continuum provides b new tool of
heiir>i«~tic orobl cm-solving for automated processes to aid non-
renetitlve types of decisions. The electronic computer as
merely a oompl ioated machine for accumulating data ?nd punching
cut osrds or tans hardly demonstrates Its eflr.'abilitles . More
•^Herbert A. Simon, The i'ew Science of Management
Decision (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, I960), p. 1.
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significant lobs for this electronic marvel are already under
consideration. Heuristic problem-solving is only one promising
extension of computers.
In order to develop an environment in which these tools
and techniques c^n serve top management in the i\avy, new
managerial relationships must evolve. These tools are not
simply information gathering machines. This is only one phase
of the decision-making process. These tools are capable of
arming the planners' imagination and capable of giving him a
vision of the whole which ftkag been sorely needed. For the first
time, it is possible to centralize management planning and execu-
tion to optimize the resources for the good of the entire Navy.
This centralization ftllovi a closer relationship between current
decisions on the one hand and future decisions on the other.
But it is known th-'t planning and directing are only
fragments of trrnap-ement; controlling is also a major considera-
tion. In the N?vy much of this control le exercised through the
Navy Comptroller who is not a part of OPMV. As a result, it
is necessary to formulate a planning system which is compatible
with the control segment, rince the uavy Comptroller has
already devised a budget formulation model (which is, in turn,
compatible with the : ; ^r>rooriation structure), it is advisable to
devplon a comparable plennlnr model, rince Kr« Jackson* s model
is flexible enough to incorporate centralization, the economic
k
Dr. Paul H. Anderson, An Integrated System for
Managing Programs and Operations with Computers," An address
before the Navy Comntrollershin Program at The George Washington
University on 28 March 1061.
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Impact of a weapons system concept, =ind the latest tools of
management, It Is a useful point of departure for discussion.
These ideas, then, ire the basis for this oaper:
Changes in administration, the economic lapaat of defense
spending, the increased need for better methods of program
planning | I closer relationship between planning, directing,
and controlling:, and finally • stronger tie between planning
and operation! research on the one hand and man and machines on
the other. Perhaps more emptors is h&a been placed on the
pressures and problems than on •? solution. Tot there be no
suggestion, hox^evrr, thrt the problems are hopeless. One
Approach hap been presented • The concepts from which this
approach arc derived are open to discussion and expansion.
If these concerts require re-organization of OFKAV or even the
Navy Department, so be it! Ho JMea, no slogan, no organization,
no individual, no creed, no orinclple is sacred. The needs of
the Navy in the 1070* s must be conceived, davalopad, and reedy
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